Russian mercenaries in Venezuela

(Russian mercenaries of the Slavonic Corps, in Syria.)

          Russian mercenaries of the Wagner Group, who have acted in Syria and Ukraine, arrived to Caracas aiming of securing the safety of Nicolás Maduro and other senior Venezuela's authorities. The report in English was initially disclosed, on January 25th, by Reuters Agency, but a survey by the Jametown Foundation showed that, indeed, the mercenaries were sent from Moscow, passing through Dakar (Senegal), Ciudad del Leste (Paraguay) and Havana (Cuba), before arriving to the Venezuelan capital by a comercial flight on 22nd. The semmingly erratic trip's trajectory raises the hypothesis that it was planned for not raising suspicions.

          According to Jamestown, Russian mercenaries arrived in Venezuela as early as May 2018, before the current political crisis, which bean in January with Maduro's inauguration for a new term as president. The new group of combatants was, therefore, added to those already in the country. There would be up to 400 new mercenaries.

          Two days after the news on Reuters, several media outlets reported that Moscow denied sending these mercenaries. Jamestown comments, however, that in general the Russian authorities' reaction have been denial or silence on the matter. On January 23rd, the Kremlin's spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, admitted that Russian private security companies operated in Sudan and came into contradiction with the Russian ambassador in the country, who in November 2018 had denied the fact. This lapse may be an indication that Russia seeks to keep silence on mercenaries hired by the government on behalf of state interests. There are Russian private companies also operating in Gabon and Central African Republic, as Coda agency has learned in detail.

          As I commented in the last post, Russia has much to lose with the fall of Maduro´s government, which is increasingly isolated internationally, but has explicit support, in addition to the Russians, China and Turkey. The government's fall would be the loss of contracts for large Russian companies, money for non-payment of loans (which Maduro have had difficulties to pay) and especially a space of political and military influence in a region close to the US. A geopolitical adversary besides Washington means the Moscow's triumph in its commitment for the corrosion of the US global leadership. Hence the dispute between of the two countries around Venezuelan crisis.

          So far, Moscow has given no indication that will send military personnel to Venezuela on the possibillity, even small, of a Washington's military intervention. While accusing the US of promoting, with its allies, a coup d'etat in Venezuela and a potential bloodshed, Russia seeks to antecipate itself to a social convulsion or even a foreign intervation using paid percenaries. At least for now.

* Published in Portuguese on January 30th, 2019.

Russia declares support for Maduro. What now?

(Putin receiving Maduro in his official residente near Moscow, on December 5th, 2018. Promise of political support.)

          Amid Venezuela's severe social, political and economic crisis, Vladimir Putin has called for President Nicolas Maduro to express support to his authority as country's president. Several countries around the world, such as US, Canada, France and Brazil, declared they don't recognize Maduro's new term and has considered Juan Guaidó, National Assembly's president, as the legitimate President in charge.

          In the message, Putin stated that "the worsening of the internal political crisis" is "provoked from outside the country", in allusion, although not exclusive, to the US, and that this interference is a "gross violation" of international law. 

          Noting the votes at the UN, international alliances and statements of Moscow and Washington, mainly after Russia annexed the Crimea and started to sponsor a war in eastern Ukraine, its clear that Venezuela is an ally of the Russians and serves as a Kremlin's space of presence in a region traditionally influenced by the US.

          Last December, Russia sent two Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjacks bombers to Venezuela to carry out military exercises with the local armed forces, where they stayed from day 10 to 14. On day 12, they performed aerial maneuvers lasting 10 hours over the Caribbean Sea. The Tu-160s were introduced in November 2017 and were designed to realize more than 10 thousands kilometers flights being capable to carry nuclear warheads.

          The bomber's presence in Venezuela was a double message to the US, which recently abandoned a treaty over nuclear warheads singed with the Soviets in 1987 (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Traty, INF, which Trump claimed of being violated several times by the Russians) and has being raising the tone of criticism against Maduro's dictatorial government. It may also be a response to the support given to Ukraine by the Americans in the Kerch Strait crisis in November 2018. Secondarily, its also a message to Jair Bonsonaro's Brazil, the largest country in Latin America, which has been a harsh critic of Caracas and seeks an alignment with Washington.

(Tupolev Tu-160)

          There's also the possibility of Russia establishing a military base in the Venezuelan island of La Orchila, in the Caribbean Sea, what would ensure permanent presence of troops in the region and would supplant logistic difficulties, such as displacement and supply of aircrafts such as Tu-160. Although Russian interest in the place is more than then years old and this possibility is unclear, a base in La Orchila would imply in a change in US-led military security in the Americas.  

          The Russian presence is also a way of reaffirming its aliance with Caracas. Between 2016 and 2017, Moscow lent at least U$ 17 billion to Venezuela, and in December 2018 (when Maduro met Putin) promised U$ 6 billion more in investment in oil industry and gold exploration. Such debts are in part paid with oil and the participation of Russian state-owned Rosneft in Venezuelan PDVSA's businesses. In the political field, Maduro has been a staunch Moscow's supporter is its geopolitical actions, such as in Ukraine and neighbouring countries.

          The question that remains in these tension days for the Venezuelans is: will Russia act before the treat of a possible Maduro's downfall? In a tense moment, the possibility of Caracas asking Moscow for a last-minute help stays open since, such as Putin's phone call showed, if the current political crisis is caused by a foreign intrvention would be legitimate for other foreigners (the Russians) to come in denfense of Maduro. In addition, the Russians have much to lose with a possible government's downfall, not only money and contracts, but also a possible mid-term military presence in the Caribbean Sea, region traditionally influenced by Washington. The picture that hasn't been seen in the Americas since the 1962 Missile Crisis could repeat, albeit to a lesser extent than the tension which almost led the world to a nuclear war.

* Published in Portuguese on January 24, 2019.

The wish of a Christian Church in Ukraine between Moscow, Constantinople and the Vatican

(Epiphanius I e Sviatoslav)

          In recent days, the leader of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Sviatoslav Shevchuk, has made several statements to promote unity between Catholics and Orthodox and the long-term possibility that his church and the newly established Ukrainian Orthodox Church merge into only one. This is a very complicated thing, since the two groups have different dogmas and saints canonized by the defense of their respective traditions.

          In an interview given on the day of Orthodox Christmas, on January 7th, Sviatoslav (called "Patriarch" by the Religious Information Service of Ukraine) stated that a unity is possible between the Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches in Ukraine based on the common inheritance of the Batism of Kievan Rus in 988, that began the Christianization of the Slavs. The common aspects of the culture such as liturgy, language and traditions certainly contribute for the unity, since the diaspora's Ukrainian Christians use the mother tongue in the liturgical rite, common to both churches, sometimes alternating Ukrainian with the receiving community's language. This union could be the creation of a Patriarchate of Kyiv recognized by both Rome and Constantinople through an Eucharistic communion.

          Sviatoslav also mentioned the catholic-orthodox dialogue at a universal level. The Catholic Church's ecumenism has began with Pope Paul VI's decree Unitatis Redintegratio, published on November 21st, 1964, at the end of the Second Vatican Council, and was reinforced by Pope John II's encyclical Ut Unum Sint, dated May 25th, 1995. In these documents, the Holy See recognizes the reality of the sacrament of Orthodox communion (allowed to Catholics in specific circumstances) and places the Eucharist, baptism and apostolic succession as the main points of unity between the Catholic and Orthodox churches.

          Another point of direct Ukrainians' interest is the rejection of "uniatism", that is, the conversion of one community to another, as occurred with the Union of Brest of 1596, when Orthodox bishops of the Catholic kingdom of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth agreed with Rome the union and gave rise to the Sviatoslav's Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

(Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I signing the Tomos - declaration document - that officialized the creation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, on January 5th, 2019, in St. George's Cathedral, Istambul. Epiphanius I is on the right.) 

          In his visit to Pope Francis at the Vatican on July 3rd, 2018, the Metropolitan talked about the relationship with Orthodox in Ukraine, who were then discussing the creation of only one church, and reaffirmed the compromise of rejection of uniatism. Thus, Sviatoslav reiterated another important element of ecumenism, stated in the Christmas' interview, which is the establishment of a constant dialogue with Orthodox through the Joint International Commission for Theological Dialogue Between the Catholic Church and Orthodox Church. The body was created by the Patriarch of Constantinoploe Dimitrius I and Jonh Paul II, when this one traveled to Istambul, on November 30th, 1979. The Commission's ultimate goal is the restoration of the Christian Church's unity existing before de 1054 schism. Since then, it has been holding several meetings to seek the common basis of both churches, and then deal with the divergences. The joint rejection of uniatism came in the Declaration of Balamand (Lebanon) in the meeting of June 1993.

          The challenge and desire of the Ukrainian Metropolitan aren't easy at all, with pressure from the Russians and Holy See's guidance. With the Constantinople's Announcement, on October 11th, 2018, of the creation of an Ukrainian Church, the Moscow Patriarchate broke relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate four days later. This placed the Holy See in a even more delicate position. On July 31st, 2018, Pope Francis had received at the Vatican a delegation led by Metropolitan Hilarion, head of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate. At the meeting, Pope said that Catholic Church (and the "Catholic Churches", an indirect statement to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church) should not interfere in the relationship among Orthodox and in the Russian Church, depriving other Catholics leaders to influence or express their views on the matter. Thus, the Holy See also presses for Ukrainians Catholics not influence the Orthodox issue in Ukraine, making the Sviatoslav's desire for unity more sensitive. Moscow withdrew the Join International Commission, of which the Ecumenical Patriarchate is a member, and choose to maintain with the papacy only bilateral relations.

          Since at least the 1960's, there has been a movement of Ukrainian Catholics for the elevation of the Greek Catholic Church to the status of Patriarchate. This would result in a strengthening of the national unity and, consequently, an approximation between Catholics and Orthodox in the country, increasing the chances of unity between the two churches. This at the expense of the Russian Church that, with the creation of the unified Ukrainian Orthodox Church on January 5th, lost religious jurisdiction over the country after 332 years. Therefore, a Catholic Patriarchate would further alienate Ukraine from Russia which, with the seizure of the Crimea and the promotion of a war in the neighboring country in 2014, is loosing the battle for the restoration of a Russian Empire with its oficial Church.

(Icon of Unity painted by an Orthodox monk from Mount Athos, Greece, in 1968.)

          Given the provisions, however cautious, of the new Ukrainian Patriarch Epiphanius I (to be enthroned on February 3rd) of collaborating in dialogue with Catholics, the enthusiastic commitment of Sviatoslav and the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I in ecumenical dialogue and the Ukrainian Catholics' desire per decades of elevating their church to the status of Patriarchate can open the doors to a unity of the churches. If this happen in the future, the consequences will be overwhelming (in a good sense), since Orthodox civilization was constructed over the spread of Christianity in the Slavic world, which would drag hundreds of millions of people into unity with the West. This would directly help the promotion of peace worldwide.

          This is a hard mission that, according to the Catholic tradition, can only be accomplished by the Holy Spirit's action.

* Published in Portuguese on January 21st, 2019.

Agreement between Greece and Macedonia is contrary to Russia. But what does Moscow has to do with this?

(Prime Ministers Zoian Zaev, of Macedonia, and Alexis Tsipras, of Greece, watch the foreign ministers signing the Prespa Agreement.)

        Everything indicates that the relationship between Greece and Russia has worsened in recent months. The cause would be the Prespa Agreement, which the Greeks made with Macedonia, and its effects to the region's geopolitics, traditionally influenced by the Russians for at least two hundred years. 

          The Prespa Agreement, signed on June 17th, 2018, resolved a dispute between Greece and Macedonia over the latter's name. Athens complained that the nomenclature was a reference to the historical region north of its territory on the border with Macedonia, and there could be claim from neighbors as to ownership of the site. With the Agreement, the country will have to take a series of administrative measures and will be called Republic of North Macedonia.

          Indeed, the small Balkan country could claim to join into the UE and NATO, becoming the military alliance's 30th member. The late country to join the alliance was small Montenegro, in April 2017, with the US support. The non-blocking of Macedonia's entry into these two organizations is the only Greek compromise in the agreement.

          That's where the problem lies between Greece and Russia. NATO is the main Moscow's military adversary, and it was the agreement closed with Greece that made viable the Macedonia's entry. Due to the name dispute, Athens had been blocking the Skopje's entry into both NATO and the European Union.  

          Just before making his trip to Serbia on January 17th, Vladimir Putin said the deal was achieved through political pressure. In this case, by the West. This in a country whose democratic regime is still fragile. And that entry into NATO should bring more instability in an already unstable region. Its not necessary to repeat here that the Kremlin's main headache is the Western military alliance. Any organization's movement provokes reaction on the other side. And vice versa. 

          To keep in mind the sensitivity of the region in the dispute between NATO and Russia, let us recall the Montenegro's cause that I commented in this blog. From September 2015 until at least May 2016, various protests erupted in Montenegro against the government, who then pleaded for NATO entry. Demonstrators complained this plan, as well as the curtailing freedom of the press, lack of democracy and calling for resignation of then-Prime Minister Mila Djukanovic, who has been in power for more than twenty years. The main opposition leaders were favorable of a closeness to Russia, and went to Moscow to seek for political support for the change of government. They promised to end the the economic sanctions against the Russians and making Montenegro a "neutral" country between a Serbia allied of Moscow and European countries linked to NATO and the EU. 

          On October 16th, 2016, Djukanovic suffered a coup attempt. Some of its perpetrators were arrested. Some group's members were Russians and/or fled to Russia. Besides the great tension, Montenegro joined NATO in April 2017.

          Returning to Greece, discomfort with Russia caused Greeks Independent party's departure from the government coalition composed with Syria bloc of the Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. An unusual alliance, given IG is a party with a fascist profile and the Syriza a left and far-left bloc.

          As I commented in two postings in June 2015 (here and here - in Portuguese), the Kremlin was one of those responsible for sewing the alliance and considered Tsipras a staunch Russia's ally. A list of factors linked Athens to Moscow: the government elected in January 2015 closed a gas sale agreement with Gazprom in February and agreed to extend the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, from the same company, until Greece in June; in 2016, Syriza voted against the EU's economic sanctions against Moscow in the European Parliament; in 2013, Alexander Dugin was in Greece for a lecture invited by the future Greek foreign minister, Niko Kotzias, calling to make Greece a Russia's means of influence in the European bloc, and in another occasion he suggested the name of Tsipras for the Greek government.

          Konstantin Malofeev, an oligarch promoter of the Kremlin's foreign policy and under the economic sanctions of the EU, was the financier of Dugin's contacts in Greece. One of the Independent Greeks' deputy was head of Greek-Russian Alliance, an organization dedicated to promoting the relations between the two countries. Both Tsipras and IG's members have been in Russia several times promising to lift the economic sanctions and promote an alliance with Moscow.

          Therefore, Greece's agreement with Macedonia not only went against the history of closeness between Greeks and Russians, as it hit the government coalition and the Kremlin's plan for Europe. Again, the pivot of all history was the great Russian adversary, the main barrier to the Eastern forces, NATO.     

* Published in Portuguese on January 17th, 2018.

Trump, partner of Russia? Ask the Germans

(Consortium Nord Stream AG's headquarters in Zug, Switzerland.)

          According to UK´s The Times, US government has warned German companies that they may be target of US economic sanctions. The cause is participation in Nord Stream 2 project, a 1.200 km gas pipeline accross the Baltic Sea that will double the natural gas import from Russia by Germany. Running alongside the existing Nord Stream, the country could receive up to 111 billions gas cubic meters per year, double its current capacity.

          The 9,4 billion euros project is run by Russia state-owned Gazprom and its promoted by the consortium Nord Stream AG, which has as Chairman of the Shareholders' Comittee German former prime-minister Gerhard Schöreder, Vladimir Putin´s personal friend. The consortium was created in 2005 with aim of constructing this gas pipeline.

          The warning of sanctions was given by the US embassador in Berlim who, according to the report, warned that "companies involved in Russian energy exports are taking part in something that could prompt a significant risk of sanctions", in addition of undermining the security of Ukraine and Europe. A new gas pipeline to Europe would allow Moscow cut off gas supply that passes through Ukraine, country in armed conflict with pro-Russian separatists. 

          In the words of an US official, the Washington´s warning is a "clear message of US policy".

(Nord Stream - in green - and Nord Stream 2 - in yellow dotted.)

          This agrees with what I commented in my last post: Trump administration isn't as close to Russia as it seems. Academic, political consultant and journalist Taras Kuzio, expert in Russian and Ukrainian politics, commented is his Twitter on January 14th that "US threatening German firms building gas pipe shows again that the Trump administration (despite its many idiosyncrasies) is a stronger ally of Ukraine than the EU".

        As expected, Poland and the Baltic States are very troubled with the Russian-German project. The latter consider Nord Stream 2 to be a political, not an economic, project which aims to increase Europe's dependence on Russian gas, and gives to Moscow capacity to politically influence the continent.

          Throughout 2019, however, Angela Merkel denfended the gas pipeline construction, whose position seems to have changed by the ende of the year due many criticism and pressure from supporters, opponents and Western allies. Trump has accused Merkel of being "captive" towards Russians.

          More than the White House's idiosyncrasies and alleged Trump's "collusion" with Russia, the threat to European security comes mainly from the energy dependence from Russia and the cooperation agreements the Kremlin has constructed with various political parties and activists in the continent.            

* Published in Portuguese on January 15th, 2019.

Trump, parceiro da Rússia? Perguntem aos alemães

(Sede do consórcio Nord Stream AG em Zug, na Suíça.)

          De acordo com o jornal The Times do Reino Unido, o governo americano alertou empresas alemãs de que elas podem ser alvos de sanções econômicas dos EUA. A causa é a participação no projeto Nord Stream 2, um gasoduto de 1.200 km através do Mar Báltico que dobrará a capacidade da importação de gás natural da Rússia para a Alemanha. Correndo ao lado do já existente Nord Stream, o país poderá receber até 111 bilhões de metros cúbicos de gás por ano, o dobro da sua capacidade atual. 

          O projeto de 9,4 bilhões de euros tem como principal empresa a estatal russa Gazprom e é promovido pelo consórcio Nord StreamAG, que tem como presidente do Comitê de Acionistas o ex-primeiro-ministro alemão Gerhard Schöreder, amigo pessoal de Vladimir Putin. O consórcio foi criado em 2005 com o objetivo de construir este gasoduto.

          O alerta de sanções foi dado pelo embaixador americano em Berlim que, segundo a reportagem, alertou que "empresas envolvidas na exportação de energia da Rússia estão participando de algo que poderia levar a um significativo risco de sanções", além de estarem minando a segurança da Ucrânia e da Europa. Um novo gasoduto até a Europa permitiria a Moscou cortar o suprimento de gás que passa pela Ucrânia, país em conflito armado com separatistas pró-Rússia. 

          Nas palavras de um funcionário americano, o alerta de Washington é uma "mensagem clara da política americana".

(Nord Stream - em verde - e Nord Stream 2 - em amarelo pontilhado.)

        Isto vai de encontro ao que comentei em minha última postagem: o governo Trump não é tão parceiro da Rússia quanto parece. O analista, consultor político e jornalista Taras Kuzio, especialista em política da Rússia e da Ucrânia, comentou em seu Twitter em 14 de janeiro que "a ameaça americana às empresas alemãs na construção do gasoduto mostra mais um vez que o governo Trump (apesar de suas muitas idiossincrasias) é um aliado da Ucrânia mais firme do que a União Europeia". 

          Como era de se esperar, Polônia e os Países Bálticos estão muito incomodados com o projeto russo-alemão. Estes últimos consideram o Nord Stream 2 um projeto político, e não econômico, que busca aumentar a dependência do gás russos pela Europa, e dá a Moscou a capacidade de influenciar politicamente o continente.

          Ao longo de 2019, porém, Angela Merkel defendeu a construção do gasoduto, posição que parece ter mudado ao final do ano devido as muitas críticas e pressões de partidários, opositores e aliados ocidentais. Trump acusou Merkel de ser "cativa" em relação aos russos.

          Mais do que as idiossincrasias da Casa Branca e o suposto "conluio" de Trump com a Rússia, a ameaça à segurança europeia vem principalmente da dependência energética da Rússia e os acordos de cooperação que o Kremlin tem construído com diversos partidos políticos e ativistas no continente.

Trump, partner of Russia? Notes on Anne Applebaum´s article

(Trump and Putin at Helsinki summit, on July 16th, 2018.)

          In the last post, I commented on the deepening of the integration between Russia and Belarus, making the later more dependent on Moscow, away from the Western countries. I used as base an article by US journalist and historian Anne Applebaum written in The Washinton Post on January 4th.

          The Applebaum´s text gave reasons for the Western countries to pay more attention to Russia´s moves towards Belarus, which they haven´t done, citing as main example the Trump´s stance. His government would have gave up US´s historical commitment to a united and free Europe (a clear allusion to his scorn for the European Union) and he would be helping to disseminate informations that collaborate for Russian propaganda on many issues, such as events (without specifying them) involving Montenegro and Afghanistan. Trump administration would have given a strange attention to a non-existent invasion plan of Belarus by Poland, for example, widely publicized by Russian media. In Applebaum´s words, the US president is "inclined to see the Russia´s point of view on most issues".

          Following Applebaum´s posts in Twitter, one realizes that the journalist and historian is a harsh critic of Trump. There is nothing unusual and wrong on this, but watching Western analysts by the same media, practically of them are harsh critics, if not mockers, on the US president. This makes more difficult a cold analysis and calls into question the alleged impartiality of the sources.      

          The US stance on Russia is seen as negative when the president addresses directly to the Russian colleague. The analyst see this, with some reason, as a caring and undeserved treatment to Putin. But let´s look at some points: early in Trump´s turn, former US diplomat in the UN, Nikki Halley, firmly stated that the US would not lift the economic sancations against Russia while it don´t give Crimea back to Ukraine. This was also the position of the US president himself. His former Secretary of Defense, Jame Mattis, was a staunch supporter of NATO, military alliance which have been the Kremlin´s main headache for more than 20 years. Furthermore, on April 11th, 2017, Trump supported the Montenegro´s entry into the aliance, and in September 2018 he still considered setting up an American military base in Poland, for displeasure of the Russians. Not only Poland, but the Baltic countries are in favor of the US presence in the region. They knew the Russian domain in Communist times and don´t want it back, nor as a possibility.

(Anne Applebaum)

          If we compare Trump´s action with his predecessor, the opposition to Russia becomes clearer. In September 2009, the Obama government gave up the anti-missile shield project in Europe launched by his predecessor, George W. Bush, on the allegation of a nuclear treat from Iran. It so happens that Iran haven´t nuclear weapons to date. The shield was clearly a defense against Russia. But a similar initiative nowadays would generate a much more aggressive reaction from Moscow, as seen in the military tensions between Russia and NATO in the second half of 2016. Obama also withdrew troops from Iraq in 2011, which would have helped the emergence and expansion of ISIS, now acting only in Syria. On the exit of the Americans from Syria decided by Trump, the impact is much less important even this helps in Russia´s consolidation in the country, whose troops have been acting since September 2015. At the annual press conference in December, Putin made clear that regards Syria as his area of influence. He stated that the presence of the US troops in the country were "illegitimate" and classified their departure as a "right decision". The US, however, continues to have a physical presence in Iraq, maintains the alliance with Saudi Arabia and has strengthened political support of Israel. In the Obama administration, there was significant worsening of the relationships with Saudis and Israelis.   

        Contrasting with the friendly words, Trump hasn´t been so condescending to Putin in fact. By the contrary: NATO´s military strengthening, guaranteeing alliances in the Middle East, and maintaining sanctions against Russia, crucial issues to curb Russia´s projection in the world, restricts the Moscow´s global action. Remains to know whether the new Secretary of Defense, Patrick Shanahan, and the new UN diplomat, a little savvy Heather Nouert (a post temporarily occupied by Jonathan Cohen since January 1st), will follow the same policy.
       
          Criticism such as Anne Applebaum´s are legitimate, but, more important than White House´s speeches and diatribes, the main issue is what is actually happening, de facto policy, mainly in economic and military matters, two of the mais Achilles´ heel of Russia. If Trump is successful in strengthening the US in the long run (the economy is booming, for example), less space will remain for Russia in the international arena. Putin´s plan to re-establish the Russian superpower and re-create its Empire depends, mainly, of taking this post from US. As we saw in the Cold War, the world was too small for two superpowers, and for the Kremlin the Cold War isn´t over.            

* Published in Portuguese on January 10th, 2019.

Moscow turns to Belarus

(Flags of Belarus and Russia.)

          In her column in The Washington Post on January 4th, Anne Applebaum tries to draw attention to recent moves that Russia has made vis-à-vis its neighbor to the west, Belarus. According to the US journalist and historian, Moscow´s imperial ambition has turned to Minsk, and some of this signals would be the possibility of the Russians take over some services of the Belarussian government as customs, visa, and monetary and tax policies. Such measures would be part of a greater project of integration of the two countries´ economy. 

          The country´s president, Alexander Lukashenka, met Putin on 6 and 25 December and, in a sign of political rapprochement, exchanged public New Year´s congratulation with his colleague. In his message, Putin said that the union between the two countries created by the treaty which established the Union State of Russia and Belarus in 1999 has been a success. Since the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, Lukashenka has distanced himself from Moscow and has tried to design a more independent foreign policy approaching to Europe. Russia, for its part, has sought to avoid distancing of Belarus and consolidate its influence in the surrounding countries. 

          On December 28th, Russian Prime Minister, Dmitri Medvedev, signed a decree that created a committee to work on integration between the two countries. The committee will be chaired by the Russian Economic Development Minister, Maxim Oreshkin. This signs a deepening of the relationship and, consequently, a greater linkage of Belarus to its most powerful neighbor.

   

          As I commented in the end of December, Belarus has given recent signals of detachment from Russia, such as Lukashenka´s statement that he will refer to the neighbour country not as a "fraternal state", but as a "partner", and the statement that no foreign military bases are needed in his country, including Russian ones. He also said that Belarus will never be part of Russia. Moscow´s reaction, therefore, isn´t surprising. As Applebaum recalls, Putin´s popularity is falling, and force demonstrations abroad, such as the wars in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, renew the Kremlin´s political capital, and reaffirm Russian power to the world.

          Finally, Applebaum recalls that the West has given less and less relevance to Minsk, and this lack of interest could encourage Moscow´s actions in a movement to absorb the neighbouring country. Its not appropriate here to analyze this possibility which has been suggested for some Western experts, but given the Putin government´s history this possibility isn´t null. I refer to the Russian politics reorganization since 2000 with a increasingly centralizing power, the aggressive actions abroad since the Russian president has resumed the post in 2012, and the strong influence of the Eurasian Movement in the military and political elite of Russia which wishes the creation of an imperial power. 

          The country´s current crisis and public discontent with the government´s plan of reforming social security announced, not by chance, during the World Cup are additional factors that could stimulate Kremlin´s actions abroad. Even if Luklashenka says to guarantee otherwise, the lack of strength and economic and energetic dependence on the Russians give him limited room of maneuver.

          Since assuming the presidency on the last day of 1999, Putin has tried to rebuild the Russian power and reestablish its Empire. This indicates the need of gaining not only power, but also terrain. Literally.       

Putin: promise of support (and the need) of the BRICS

(7th BRICS Conference in Ufa, Russia. July 2015.)

          On the last day of 2018, Vladimir Putin sent New Year´s messages to the presidents of the four BRICS countries, Brazil, India, China and South Africa. In the messages, promises were made to maintain strategical cooperation with each one of them as well as the bloc´s joint cooperation in the international organizations. 

          Emphasis on bilateral cooperation was given to China. Putin said the partnership between the two countries is at an "unprecedented level". With GDP expected to grow only 1,7%, a partnership with the world second-largest economy with a growth rate around 6% is key. Its worth to remember that in July 2014, Russia and China made U$ 400 billion deal for the sale Russian natural gas to the Asian giant. In times of tension with the Western countries and the inflow of liquefied gas from US to Europe since April 2016, Russia leans to Asia searching for support and money.

          As for Brazil, there may be changes in the relationship with Russia. Putin also send New Year´s congratulations to the new president-elect, Jair Bolsonaro. But Bolsonaro has indicated, on several occasions throughout his campaign, the intention of approaching the US and Israel. The choice of the new chancellor, Ernesto Araújo, a strong supporter of a pro-Western policy, as his article "Brazil in the boat of Ulisses" (in portuguese) makes clear, should mean, if not some distancing, at least a displeasure for Moscow. Alexander Dugin, founder of the Eurasian Movement and the most influential thinker in Russia´s military and political circles, stated in Facebook that Bolsonaro is a "ultra-liberal authoritarian" and that supports the left in Brazil, explaining in another post that it is a non-globalist left. This indicantes a possible rejection of the new president by the Kremlin.

          In the last years, the BRICS has shown opposition to the US and the Western attitudes in the global arena. Russia, China and Brazil (up to the Dilma government) have been the main actors in this regard. Brazil´s new role in the world is still open, but for Russia regions such as Asia and Europe have greater relevance, particularly the military partnership with China and its gigantic commodity market.

          

Belarus: ally of Russia, but not so much

(Putin of Rússia, Lukashenka of Belarus, and Poroshenko of Ukraine.)

          In recent years, Belarus has shown signal of ditachment from Russia, mainly since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, not recognized by the Minsk government, at the same time as it has sought a rapproachement to the West. The official position is to search for a more independent foreign policy, not so much tied to Moscow.

          On 27th December, an economist from Belarus State University warned of possibility of the Weatern countries creating a movement against Moscow and install a pro-Western government in Minsk. These countries would be politically and financially promoting people comitted to this agenda. This narrative is common among members and supporters of the Russian government, who seek, some times in a deribelately exaggerated way, for a "fifth column" in their territory. The background of the argument, as expected, the wave of protests that in February of 2014 toppled president Yanukovich, in Ukraine, and gave way to the rise of the Pietro Poroshenko´s pro-Western government.

          In another episode on last 24th, the country´s president, Alexander Lukashenka, said he would refer to Russia not as a "fraternal state", but only as a "partner", which in the Russian political language is a much more vague term of varied interpretation. According to him, its like the Russians see his country. Although its only rhetorical, the words coming from a leader in power since 1994 indicate a Minsk´s tendency to distance himself from Moscow. Lukashenka has accumulating a number of pronouncements in this sense. 

       
          Russia, however, regards Belarus a key neighbor, given the possibility of expanding it´s political and military action to the Europe´s borders, as it was exemplified by the Zapad, a major military training conducted in September 2007 just in Western Belarus, near the border with Poland. At that time, up to 100 thousand soldiers of both countries were deployed. Despite this sort of cooperation, the Lukashenka government resists the idea of permanent presence of foreign troops in its territory, also referring to Russia, which plans a military base in the neighboring territory.

          Despite Belarus being culturally very similar to Russia and dependent on its commercial products, especially natural gas, in recent years Lukasehnka has shown not so faithful to his most powerful partner. Its a few safe position for a small country that has by its side a giant that militarily occupies three of its neighboring countries.                    

Bielorrússia: aliado da Rússia, mas nem tanto

(Putin da Rússia, Lukashenka da Bielorrússia e Poroshenko da Ucrânia.)

          Nos últimos anos, a Bielorrússia tem dado sinais de distanciamento em relação à Rússia, principalmente desde a anexação da Crimeia em 2014, não reconhecida pelo governo de Minsk, ao mesmo tempo em que tem buscado uma aproximação com o Ocidente. A posição oficial é de busca por uma política externa mais independente, não tão atrelada à Moscou.

          Neste dia 27, um economista da Universidade Estatal da Bielorrússia alertou da possibilidade dos países ocidentais criarem um movimento contra Moscou e instalar um governo pró-Ocidente em Minsk. Estes países estariam promovendo política e financeiramente pessoas comprometidas esta agenda. A narrativa é comum entre membros e apoiadores do governo russo, que buscam, por vezes de forma propositalmente exagerada, por uma "quinta coluna" em seu território. O pano de fundo do argumento, como não poderia deixar de ser, foi a onda de protestos que em fevereiro de 2014 derrubou o presidente Yanukovich, na Ucrânia, e deu passagem para a ascensão do governo pró-Ocidente de Pietro Poroshenko. 

           Noutro episódio no último dia 24, o presidente do país, Alexander Lukashenka, disse que passará a se referir à Rússia não como um "Estado fraternal", mas apenas como "parceiro", que na linguagem política russa é um termo muito mais vago e de variada interpretação. Segundo ele, é como os russos vêem seu país. Ainda que seja apenas retórica, as palavras vindas de um governante no poder desde 1994 indicam a tendência de distanciamento de Minsk em relação à Moscou. Lukashenka vem acumulando uma série de pronunciamentos neste sentido.

          A Rússia, porém, considera a Bielorrússia um vizinho fundamental, dada a possibilidade de expandir sua ação política e militar até as fronteiras da Europa, como ficou exemplificado pelo Zapad, grande treinamento militar realizado em setembro de 2017 justamente no oeste da Bielorrússia, próximo à fronteira com a Polônia. Na ocasião, foram mobilizados até 100 mil militares de ambos os países. Apesar deste tipo de cooperação, o governo Lukashenka resiste à ideia da presença permanente de militares estrangeiros em seu território, fazendo referência também à Rússia, que planeja uma base militar no territória vizinho.

           Apesar da Bielorrúsia ser culturalmente muito similar à Rússia e dependente de seus produtos comerciais, principalmente o gás natural, nos últimos anos Lukashenka tem se mostrado não tão fiel ao seu parceiro mais poderoso. Uma posição pouco segura para um pequeno país que tem ao seu lado um gigante que ocupa militarmente três de seus países vizinhos.   

          

Lithuania: KGB´s files reveal link with the Russian Church

(Kirill, Patriarch of the Russian Church, Putin and Medvedev.)

          On the 20th December, Lithuania has released some former KBS´s files (country was under Soviet rule from 1944 to 1991) which shows the institution´s link with the Moscow Patriarchate. Nowadays, there are some hierarchical members of the Russian Orthodox Church who have been (or are) involved with the Russian secret service, now called FSB, among them Metropolitan Alexandr of Riga, leader of the Latvian Orthodox Church linked to Moscow.

          Paul Goble says that in the Putin era the penetration of the secret service penetration into the Russian Church has increased aiming, he comments, of using ecclesial property to cover up it´s business. The church is also one of the ideological basis of the government, which stands as defender of traditional values and Christianity, seeking trying to expand it´s influence outside Russia.

        It must to be considered that the release of the files has come precisely in time of tension among Moscow, Kyiv and Constantinople around the formation of a new Ukrainian Orthodox Church, hitting the Russian Church´s imagem and thus helping in it´s demoralization among the Orthodox faithful. Given Lithuania´s history of opposition to Russia, the files´ opening at this time doesn´t seem a coincidence.

Lituânia: arquivos da KGB revelam ligação com a Igreja Russa

(Kirill, Patriarca da Igreja Ortodoxa Russa, Putin e Medvedev.) 

          No último dia 20, a Lituânia divulgou alguns arquivos da antiga KGB (o país ficou sob domínio soviético de 1944 a 1991) que mostram o vínculo da instituição com o Patriarcado de Moscou. Atualmente, há membros da alta hierarquia da Igreja Ortodoxa Russa que estiveram (ou estão) envolvidos com o serviço secreto russo, hoje chamado FSB, entre eles o Metropolita Alexandr de Riga, líder da Igreja Ortodoxa Lituana vinculada a Moscou.

          Paul Goble afirma que na era Putin a penetração do serviço secreto na Igreja Russa aumentou com o objetivo, comenta, de utilizar as propriedades eclesiais para encobrir seus negócios. A igreja também é uma das bases ideológicas do governo, que se coloca como defensor dos valores tradicionais e do cristianismo, buscando expandir sua influência fora da Rússia.

          Há de se considerar que a divulgação do arquivo veio justamente no período de tensão entre Moscou, Kiev e Constantinopla em torno da formação de uma nova Igreja Ortodoxa Ucraniana, atingindo a imagem da Igreja Russa e, portanto, ajudando na sua desmoralização entre os fiéis ortodoxos. Dado o histórico de oposição que a Lituânia faz à Rússia, a abertura dos arquivos neste momento não parece uma coincidência.

The "unknown woman" and the search for Russia´s national identity

(Painting "Portrait of an Unknown Woman", by Ivan Kramskoi. The painting is exposed at Tretyakov Gallery, in Moscow.)

          A few weeks ago I´ve got very impressed when I saw the image in the painting reproduced above. It´s name is "Portrait of an Unknown Woman" by the Russian painter Ivan Kramskoi, 1883. When I opened the screen it seemed I was in front of a real woman. Her deep gaze blends arrogance with seduction, and it´s further pronunced by the contrast of the face with the dark dress and the snowy enviroment in the background. It seemed the woman would jump off the painting to talk with me or go beyond a mere conversation.

          Kramskoi was part of "The Itinerants" (Peredvyhznyky), group of Russian painters who sought to educate the people throught art, travelling and holding exhitions of their works in the Russia´s interior. According to Orlando Figes in the book Natasha´s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia, in the early 1860´s these painters moved away from the Academy of Arts of Saint Petersburg (today Imperial Academy of Arts) and, rejecting the European classicism of this school, they began to work with what the author calls "Russian style", inspiring themselves in the people´s folkloric and religious traditions. The withdraw happened with the rebellion of fourteens students of the academy who was known as "Wanderers", led by Kramskoi, who demanded freedom of choice in the paintings content. Many artist of this trend worked at the Stroganov School of Arts (today Stroganov Moscow State University of Industry and Arts), which received people of vairous social classes and who, therefore, knew the diversity of Russian society. They were sponsored by the great merchants of emergent Moscow, among them Pavel Tretyakov, railroads magnate and Russian arts collector who names the gallery where Kramskoi´s painting stands. The Russian painter was one of those sponsored by Tretyakov and was an important portraitist of the time, having reproduced people of the cultural milleu such as the Russian writer Lev Tostoy and Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko. In Figes´ words, Kramskoi "painted against a simple background and concentrated on the face, attracting the spectators to the eyes and forcing them to penetrante in the inner world of the people whom they had treated as slaves until yesterday"* (Chatper 4, part 2). The author referes to the servitude regime which was in effect in Russia until it´s abolition by Tzar Alexander II in 1861. 

          In Kramskoi´s time all the Russian intelligentsia was obsessed in understanding the peasant, discovering their people´s identity and answering the question: "who are we?" The question crossed the whole 19th century and, despite the supression of the Soviet regime throughout the 20th century, the search for an answer continued with Slavophiles and Eurasianist and continuous to this day. This doubt came to light strenghtly with the invasion of Russia by Napoleon in 1812, crushing the idea of an Europe as source of civilization, which led the first Russian artists and intellectuals to question the true identity of their people and the path that Russia should follow in the future. But the issue had already began to emerge a little earlier, around 1800, when it was flourishing a Russian "national" culture still dominated by an idealized image of Europe. In the view of the early artists, the imperial court and it´s Europenized city, Saint Petersburg, were artifical and strange to the Russian culture. Satires and plays sought to identify who was the "Russian" in contrast to the European inhabitant. In Orlando Figes´ words:

"Against the background of this domination by Europe, satires (...) began to define the Russian character in distintive terms other than Western values. These writers established the antithesis between the foreign artifice and the native truth, European reason and heart of the Russian soul which would be the basis of the national narrative of the 19th century. At the heart of this discourse was the ancient romantic ideal of the native soil - an 'organic'  and pure Russia, not corrupted by civilization. Saint Petersburg was just deceit and vanity, a narcissistic dandy watching all the time his reflection on the Neva River. The real Russia was in the provinces, a place without pretensions or foreign conventions where the simple 'Russian' virtues were preserved."* (Chapter 1, part 5)   

          The figure of the unknown woman wasn´t a peasant, not even a common "citizen" as we conceive in the modern society. Judging by the time and the bakcground of the picture, the woman resembles a noble or member of the emerging merchant class. But this is part of "real" Russia, to use a word that can define the ideal sought by the Russian artists of the 19th century. Despite not beeing a peasant, the unkonown woman composes part of the national synthesis dreamed by these artists and, more especifically, by movements like the populist and "native soil". The first appeared 1874 and worked with the peasants promoting education, arts and political activism of socialist profile and aimed to lead Russia to development combining the European way with the people´s traditions; the second, which emerged at the same time, was a cultural movement composed of writers which published texts that extolled national unity and appealed to the artists to portray the people´s life and bring them the Western culture. The populists and members of the "native soil" wanted to unite the different parts of society into a single nation, to realize the national synthesis between the noble and the peasant.

          The Kramkoi´s painting offers a plunge into the Russian soul through the beautiful and seductive look of the unknown woman, face which offers to us a facet of a multifaceted nation. It´s an attempt to translate what Kramskoi saw at the streets while probing the question "who are we?" Art has this strength, of seeing the reality of the other, of a distant people, as if we were there and we were part of their identity.

* Free translation of the author.

** Published in Portuguese on December, 24th 2017.

A "mulher desconhecida" e a busca pela identidade nacional da Rússia

(Quadro "Retrato de Uma Mulher Desconhecida", de Ivan Kramskoi. Pintura está exposta na Galeria Tretyakov, em Moscou.)

Há algumas semanas atrás fiquei muito impressionado quando via a imagem do quadro reproduzido acima. Seu nome é "Retrato de uma Mulher Desconhecida", do pintor russo Ivan Kramskoi, de 1883. Quando abri a tela parecia que estava em frente a uma mulher de verdade. Seu olhar profundo mistura arrogância com sedução, e ficam mais acentuados pelo contraste do rosto com a vestimenta escura e o ambiente nivoso ao fundo. Parecia que a mulher saltaria do quadro para falar comigo ou ir além de uma mera conversa.

          Kramskoi fazia parte de "Os Itinerantes", grupo de pintores russos que buscava educar o povo pela arte, viajando e realizando exposições de suas obras no interior da Rússia. Segundo Orlando Figes no livro Uma história cultural da Rússia, no início da década de 1860 estes pintores se afastaram da Academia de Artes de São Petersburgo (hoje academia Imperial de Artes) e, rejeitando o classicismo europeu desta escola, passaram a trabalhar com aquilo que o autor chama de "estilo russo", inspirando-se nas tradições folclórica e religiosa do povo. A retirada ocorreu com a rebelião de catorze estudantes da academia que ficaram conhecidos como "Vagantes", liderados com Kramskoi, que exigiam liberdade de escolha no conteúdo das pinturas. Muitos artistas desta corrente trabalharam na Escola de Artes Stroganov (hoje Universidade Estatal de Moscou de Artes e Indústria Stroganov), que recebia pessoas de variadas classes sociais e que, portanto, conheciam a diversidade da sociedade russa. Eles eram patrocinados pelos grandes mercadores da emergente Moscou, entre eles Pavel Tretyakov, magnata do setor de ferrovias e colecionador de arte russa que dá nome à galeria onde está o quadro de Kramskoi. O pintor russo foi um dos patrocinados por Tretyakov e era importante retratista da época, tendo reproduzido personalidades do meio cultural como o escritor russo Lev Tostoy e poeta ucraniano Taras Shevchenko, além do czar Alexandre III. Nas palavras de Figes, Kromskoi "pintava contra um pano de fundo simples e se concentrava no rosto, atraindo os espectadores para os olhos e forçando-os a penetrar no mundo interior das pessoas que ontem mesmo tinha tratado como escravas" (p. 296). O autor faz referência ao regime de servidão que vigorou na Rússia até sua abolição pelo czar Alexandre II em 1861.

          Na época de Kramskoi toda a intelectualidade russa estava obcecada por compreender o camponês, descobrir a identidade de seu povo e responder à questão: "quem somos nós?". A pergunta atravessou a totalidade do século XIX e, apesar da supressão do regime soviético ao longo do século XX, a busca por uma resposta continuou com os eslavófilos e eurasianistas e se mantém até hoje. Esta dúvida veio com força à tona com a invasão da Rússia por Napoleão em 1812, fazendo desmoronar a ideia de uma Europa como fonte de civilização, o que levou os primeiros artistas e intelectuais russos a questionar a verdadeira identidade de seu povo e o caminho que a Rússia deveria seguir no futuro. Mas a questão já começara a aflorar um pouco antes, em torno de 1800, época em que germinava uma cultura "nacional" russa ainda dominada pela imagem idealizada da Europa. Na visão dos primeiros artistas, a corte imperial e sua cidade europeizada, São Petersburgo, eram artificiais e estranhas à cultura russa. Sátiras e peças teatrais buscavam identificar quem era o "russo" em contraste com o habitante europeu. Nas palavras de Orlando Figes:

"Contra o pano de fundo dessa dominação pela Europa, sátiras (...) começaram a definir o caráter russo em termos distintos dos valores do Ocidente. Esses escritores estabeleceram a antítese entre o artifício estrangeiro e a verdade nativa, razão europeia e coração da 'alma' russa que seria base da narrativa nacional do século XIX. No âmago desse discurso estava o antigo ideal romântico do solo nativo - de uma Rússia 'orgânica' e pura, e não corrompida pela civilização. São Petersburgo era apenas engano e vaidade, um dândi narcisista a observar o tempo todo o seu reflexo no rio Neva. A Rússia real ficava nas províncias, um lugar sem pretensões nem convenções estrangeiras onde as simples virtudes 'russas' se mantinham preservadas." (p. 96)

          A figura da mulher desconhecida não era uma camponesa, nem mesmo uma "cidadã" comum como concebemos na sociedade moderna. A julgar pela época e o pano de fundo do quadro, a mulher lembra uma nobre ou membro da classe emergente de comerciantes. Mas esta é parte da Rússia "verdadeira", para utilizar uma palavra que possa definir o ideal almejado pelos artistas russos do século XIX. Apesar de não ser camponesa, a mulher desconhecida compõe parte da síntese nacional sonhada por estes artistas e, mais especificamente, por movimentos como o populista e o "solo nativo". O primeiro surgiu em 1874 e atuou junto aos camponeses promovendo a educação, as artes e o ativismo político de perfil socialista e tinha como objetivo levar a Rússia ao desenvolvimento combinando uma via europeia com as tradições do povo; o segundo, surgido na mesma época, era um movimento cultural composto por escritores que publicavam textos onde exaltavam a unidade nacional e apelavam aos artistas para que retratassem a vida do povo e levassem a eles a cultura do Ocidente. Os populistas e membros do "solo nativo" queriam unir as diferentes partes da sociedade numa única nação, realizar a síntese nacional entre o nobre e o camponês.

          O quadro de Kramskoi oferece um mergulho na alma russa através do olhar belo e sedutor da mulher desconhecida, rosto este que nos oferece uma faceta de uma nação multifacetada. É uma tentativa de traduzir o que Kramskoi viu nas ruas ao sondar a pergunta "quem somos nós?" A arte tem esta força, de vermos a realidade do outro, de um povo distante, como se lá estivéssemos e fizéssemos parte de sua identidade.