How will Russia react to the foundation of the new Ukrainian Church?

(Bartholomew I and Putin)

          With the oficial announcement of creation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate on January 5th this year, the Russian Orthodox Church lost canonical (religious) jurisdiction over the Ukrainian territory after 332 years. In 1686, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople had placed then Kyiv Patriarchate under the Moscow's authority, expanding canonical territory of the latter. At the time, what is now known as "Ukraine" had a territory very diferent than today. Constantinople revoked this inclusion in the Announcement of October 11th last year.

          Without a direct religious influence, both the Russian Church and the Russian government has lost much of their ability of culturally and politically influence the Ukrainian population. As we recurrently see, Patriarch Kirill and President Putin often appear in public together and have a very similar discourse when it comes to define the country's identity, a task that the Kremlin has taken for itself and uses as one of its political and ideological foundations.

          This political and cultural link between Church and State in Russia makes the power an element of action and reaction to events involving the religious sphere.

          According to Paul Goble, the Western countries don't understand the Russia's reaction to events of such magnitude as the current religious quarrel. For Moscow, it means to give up its historical imperial role. The creation of the Ukrainian Church dimembered from the Russian Church means the retraction of the Russia's role in the world, and directly on the neighboring peoples. Since Putin can do nothing about it, at least not directly, Goble's expectation is a much more negative action than that waited by the West and the neighboring countries, which generally underestimate a Russian reaction. The takover of the Crimea and the start of the war in Ukraine in response to the protests of 2013-14 that overthrew Yanukovich, Moscow's political ally, is the most evident example of this.         

(Capture of Ukrainians sailors, in smaller boats, on November 25th of last year, in the Black Sea.)

          There are other elements which can contribute to a Russia's aggressive reaction and that apparently have nothing to do with the religious issue. The conflict in Ukraine may be an environment and the justification of this reaction. In a paper published on February 1st, political scientist Andreas Umland points to a possible unraveling of the conflict, which has the potential to move from the Donbas region to the Azov Sea, which bathes ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, important for eastern Ukraine. The capture of 24 Ukrainian sailors by the Russian navy on the Kerch Strait last November 25th signals this possibility. Umland cites four factors for this possible geographical shift of the conflict: the lack of West's reaction to the Kerch Strait crisis (12 days after the article, a US Senate bipartisan commission has done a legislation to apply new sanctions on Moscow due, among other things, to this crisis), the absence of international monitoring organizations in the Azov Sea, the viability of the new Kerch Strait Bridge inaugurated by Russia in May 2018 (too much expensive and underutilized), and the precarious drinking water service in the Crimea.

          If Goble is right, the Russia's strong annoyance due the creation of the new Ukrainian Church may be a fifth factor, not properly geopolitical, but as motivator for an aggressive reaction by the Kremlin.

          But some actions would be in progress. According to the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) (also reported by the Religious Information Service of Ukraine, an inter-religious profile agency), Russian spies and security services from Donbas would be recruiting Ukrainians to arson churches run by Orhodox priests who left the Ukrainian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to join the new Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. In return, they would receive U$ 2.000 for the service. The agent should film the action to prove the attack and then would have the money deposited into his bank account. The SBU states to have aborted the recruiting of an Ukrainian. This would be an action not only to intimidate the territorial expansion of the Kyiv's Church, but also to punish those who would be "traitors" according to the Kremlin.

          The country inherited from Soviet Union the instrumentalization of the Russia Church for its foreign policy. Church and State work together in this matter, in which the Church becomes a beneficiary of the political order created by the State. An example is the Crimea itself, where the only Ukranian Church's parish, in Simferopol, is at risk of losing operating permission for not adapting to Russian legislation. According to the law, religious groups can only own properties with a register with the State, what the Ukrainian Church could not do, since the country it represents doesn't recognize the Crimea as part of Russia. Another case was the ownership of the St. Nicholas Cathedral in Nice, France, by the Russian state, in January 2010. In 2007, the Kremlin had filed a lawsuit in French court alleging that the ownership of the cathedral by the exiled community from Revolution of 1917 has expired after 99 years. With the case won, Russia received, in addition to the building, around 300 rare religious icons. This kind of procedure is a way of promoting the Russian culture abroad and expanding what Moscow calls the "Russian world".

(Rare wooden church in flames in Gorlovka, eastern Ukraine, on August 8th, 2014. This is representative of the religious effects of conflict and tension between churches and governments.)

          Another Russia's possible action would be by judicial procedure, not in Ukraine, but in Turkey. The PhD in law and director of a research institute in Moscow, Igor Ponkin, lists a series of crime that Bartholomew I, the Ecumencial Patriarch of Constantinople, would have commited by nullifying the decision of the Synodal Letter of 1686 (and by publishing the Tomos of autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church on January 5th, that the author doesn't analyze). Bartholomew (whom Ponkin calls by the civil name Dimitrios Arhondis, disqualifying him for the position) would have made a false annulment of the old decision, stating that the current legal language is innocuous in relation to the terminology of the time. Ukraine, that at the time didn't exist as such, also had a very difrerent territory. Ponkin accuses the Patriarch of serious crimes under the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and the Constitution and Penal Code of Turkey, where he lives, suggesting a criminal action against him. Bartholomew would be violating nine articles of these three laws, among them promoting a social convulsion in a foreign country from Turkey, incitating inter-religious hatred (in Ukraine and Turkey), and promoting a war between Russia and Ukraine. The Ponkin's position is clear: Bartholomew would not be a legitimate Patriarch, and it would be up to Turkey (in line with Russia) to take the appropriate legal measures.

          While Russia doesn't act explicitly on the religious issue, analysts keep speculating its possible reactions. Based on recent history, we will still see what the Kremlin will do to compensate the lost position.

* Published in Portuguese on February 26th, 2019.

Kirill, Putin and the loss of Ukraine

(Kirill in his 10 years speech as Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church.)

          Last February 1st, Patriarch Kirill celebrated his 10 years at the head of the Russian Orthodox Church. The celebration was made at the State Palace in the Moscow Kremlin in presence of Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, Igor Dodon, President of Moldova, and political and religious authorities.

          In his speech, Kirill said the two major Christianity's challenges today are the reintegration of the Church into society, bridging the gap between them and reintroducing in people the values defended by the Christian faith, and the supposed absolute science's authority, which proposes technical progress at the expense of the ethical principles and the dissemination of transhumanism, a philosophy which bets on the "improving" of the human nature. Most of his speech was dedicated to these matters.

          At the beginning of his explanation, however, the Patriarch paid attention to the Ukraine's situation. He said that the new structure of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (without quoting it directly), made official on last January 5th, consisted of a "pseudo-church structure consisting of schismatics".  He blamed the Ukrainian authorities and the Constantinople Patriarchate for intruding into the canonical territory of the Ukrainian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Kyiv government for discriminating the Russian believers, take their churches and encourage inter-religious hatred.

          The statements on Ukraine repeated the accusation of persecution to the Orthodox of the Russian Church by the Ukrainian government that Kirill disclosed in a letter sent on December 14th, 2018 to several political and religious leaders of the world, such as Pope Francis, Archbishop of Canterbury Justin Welby, the head of the World Council of Churches Olav Fyske Tveil, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, among others.   

          The presence of Putin and Dodon (Russian president's ally) in celebration of his enthronement, the political matter and the letter sent to civic and religious leaders show the Kirill's political action in national and foreign issues. Kirill is muche more than "only" the religious leader of the Russian Orthodox Church. He's also the disseminator of ideas which are shared by the Russian state, with whom he works in consonance.

(Putin's speech. Crowded State Palace in the Kremlin.) 

          Before the Patriarch, Vladimir Putin made a speech of about 10 minutes. He congratulated Kirill for the date, praised his work and extoled the actions of the Russian Orthodox Church in various fields of society, both inside and outside the country, establishing relationships with other peoples and churches. So that Putin recalled the Ukraine issue, making incisive statements and harshly condemning what he regarded as a "parasitizing" of the country's religious life by the Kiyv government, whose project "is not related to faith, but a false one". He was tougher in comparing the Kiyv's action which, in April, through Parliament, called for the creation of an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church, accepted on October 11th by Constntinople, to the Bolcheviks, who persecuted, controlled and murdered almost all of the Orthodox religious in the former USSR, mainly between 1918 and 1939.

"In essence, there is a gross interference in the church life. Its initiators seemed to learn from the godless of the last century, who expelled believers from churches, poisoned and persecuted the clergy."

          The explanation was followed by audience's applause. 

          The president said that the Russian authorities will never accept the interference of the state in the Church's affairs, manly abroad, and that they "reserve the right to react and do everything to protect human rights, including freedom of religion".

          The 1993 Constitution of Russia guarantees Church-State separation (Article 14) since the effective separation by Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Association signed on October 1st, 1990 by Mikhail Gorbachev and reaffirmed it in a new law of September 26th, 1997, where recognizes the special role in the country of the Russian Orthodox Church and gives special recognition to Islam, Judaism and Buddhism, the so-called "traditional religions".

          The religious freedom, however, has been restricted in Russia, especially after introduction of a series of amendments to the anti-terrorism laws known as Yarovaya Law, passed on June 24th, 2016. Under the pretext of combating extremism, the law made registration, property ownership and missionary action of religious groups more difficult, especially the religions considered "non-traditional" and that refuse to register officially with the state. The groups most affected were Christian minorities and Eastern religions. One of the most visible consequences was the ban of The Administrative Center of the Jeovah's Witnesses in Russia on April 20th, 2017. All its facilities were owned by the state and the religious activities were banned. Baptist Christian were also persecuted, and until a few months ago there were around twenty of their members in jail. Despite being largely privileged for being a majority, to be considered one of the traditional religions and to enjoy agreements with public institutions such as universities, some religious of the Russian Orthodox Church have been complained of restrictions imposed on minority groups by the government.

          Putin's accusation against Kyiv government also fit to Donbass region in a war waged by pro-Russian fighters with Moscow's support. There have been several allegations of violation of religious freedom, including the murdering of four Protestant religious, as pointed out in a document of the Belgium's IPHR organization in partnership with the Ukraine's CCL as early as April 2015. These persecutions are promoted by battalions such as The Most Glorious Legion of Don, made up by Cossacks self-proclaimed defenders of the Orthodox faith, and the Russian Orthodox Army, led by the main Russian fighter, Igor Strelkov. Some religious and priests of the Russian Orthodox Church, although not in the majority, have supported these fighters. Ukraine would be the only country in the world where there's an armed conflict of Christians against Christians.

(From left to right: Igor Dodon, Kirill and Putin.)

          There are speculations of how Putin will react to the loss of the Ukraine's canonical territory. Some experts believe that the Kremlin could react militarily in a way of giving new impetus to the war in neighboring country. In this context, the Kerch Strait crisis could be a bait to trigger new military action.

          On December 22nd, five days after the Unification Council in Kyiv chose Epiphanius as leader of the new Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill said the Russian Church should analyze the possibility of a new concordat with the Russian state in order to deep cooperation between both; should rethink its action for the unity of Ortodoxy, broken on October 15th, and seek in Vatican an ally in this regard (given Francis' posture, the Catholic Church will do its utmost to not displease Moscow in the name of ecumenical dialogue); and should work to expand its influence abroad. These guidelines point directly to the need to reverse the territorial loss in Ukraine, the prestige of the Church in Orthodoxy and of Russia in the world stage.       

          According to Yuri Ruban, high official of the Kyiv's Presidential Administration, Kirill intends to go to Ukraine and to visit Pechersk Lavra (Cave Monastery), one of the major spiritual center of the Orthodox world and where, according to the letter of December 14th, the Ukrainian authorities would be trying to private its use by Russian Church's monks. The trip would aim, among other things, to support pro-Russian candidates for country's presidency, whose election will be on March 31st. For Yuri, the Kremlin is using the faith to politically influence the Ukrainian voters.

          Even if Kirill goes to Ukraine without any political pretension, his single presence would demand a huge security scheme and a complicated negotiation between two countries whose relations have worsened to much since 2014. Its to be expected also the reaction of nationalist groups, including anti-Russia extremists. Needless to say that this would provoke more tension in the region. This would give Russia excuses to retaliate any Ukrainian action, such as the supposed invasion of the Russian territorial waters in the case of the Kerch Strait.

          As much as a Patrarch's visit is religiously legitimate (and even if Kirill and Putin didn't take the same tune in their speeches as on the occasion of the 10-year celebration of the Patriarch's enthronement, or that Church-State separation in Russia constituted a strict secularism), this would be the occasion for Moscow to make excuses and act politically and militarily in Ukraine.

          In addition to the strong political divergences that erupted with Euromaidan in the end of 2013, the seizure of the Crimea and the ensuing war in 2014, for the expert Taras Kuzio the formation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is another chapter (perhaps definitive) of the loss of Ukraine by Russia. This is the hardest blow on Putin's claim to restore the Russian Empire.

          While the trip remains at the level of possibility, the Ukrainians expect a Russian reaction for the loss of Ukraine. For a while, Putin continues only in rethoric.

* Published in Portuguese on February 5th, 2019.

The wish of a Christian Church in Ukraine between Moscow, Constantinople and the Vatican

(Epiphanius I e Sviatoslav)

          In recent days, the leader of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Sviatoslav Shevchuk, has made several statements to promote unity between Catholics and Orthodox and the long-term possibility that his church and the newly established Ukrainian Orthodox Church merge into only one. This is a very complicated thing, since the two groups have different dogmas and saints canonized by the defense of their respective traditions.

          In an interview given on the day of Orthodox Christmas, on January 7th, Sviatoslav (called "Patriarch" by the Religious Information Service of Ukraine) stated that a unity is possible between the Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches in Ukraine based on the common inheritance of the Batism of Kievan Rus in 988, that began the Christianization of the Slavs. The common aspects of the culture such as liturgy, language and traditions certainly contribute for the unity, since the diaspora's Ukrainian Christians use the mother tongue in the liturgical rite, common to both churches, sometimes alternating Ukrainian with the receiving community's language. This union could be the creation of a Patriarchate of Kyiv recognized by both Rome and Constantinople through an Eucharistic communion.

          Sviatoslav also mentioned the catholic-orthodox dialogue at a universal level. The Catholic Church's ecumenism has began with Pope Paul VI's decree Unitatis Redintegratio, published on November 21st, 1964, at the end of the Second Vatican Council, and was reinforced by Pope John II's encyclical Ut Unum Sint, dated May 25th, 1995. In these documents, the Holy See recognizes the reality of the sacrament of Orthodox communion (allowed to Catholics in specific circumstances) and places the Eucharist, baptism and apostolic succession as the main points of unity between the Catholic and Orthodox churches.

          Another point of direct Ukrainians' interest is the rejection of "uniatism", that is, the conversion of one community to another, as occurred with the Union of Brest of 1596, when Orthodox bishops of the Catholic kingdom of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth agreed with Rome the union and gave rise to the Sviatoslav's Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

(Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I signing the Tomos - declaration document - that officialized the creation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, on January 5th, 2019, in St. George's Cathedral, Istambul. Epiphanius I is on the right.) 

          In his visit to Pope Francis at the Vatican on July 3rd, 2018, the Metropolitan talked about the relationship with Orthodox in Ukraine, who were then discussing the creation of only one church, and reaffirmed the compromise of rejection of uniatism. Thus, Sviatoslav reiterated another important element of ecumenism, stated in the Christmas' interview, which is the establishment of a constant dialogue with Orthodox through the Joint International Commission for Theological Dialogue Between the Catholic Church and Orthodox Church. The body was created by the Patriarch of Constantinoploe Dimitrius I and Jonh Paul II, when this one traveled to Istambul, on November 30th, 1979. The Commission's ultimate goal is the restoration of the Christian Church's unity existing before de 1054 schism. Since then, it has been holding several meetings to seek the common basis of both churches, and then deal with the divergences. The joint rejection of uniatism came in the Declaration of Balamand (Lebanon) in the meeting of June 1993.

          The challenge and desire of the Ukrainian Metropolitan aren't easy at all, with pressure from the Russians and Holy See's guidance. With the Constantinople's Announcement, on October 11th, 2018, of the creation of an Ukrainian Church, the Moscow Patriarchate broke relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate four days later. This placed the Holy See in a even more delicate position. On July 31st, 2018, Pope Francis had received at the Vatican a delegation led by Metropolitan Hilarion, head of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate. At the meeting, Pope said that Catholic Church (and the "Catholic Churches", an indirect statement to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church) should not interfere in the relationship among Orthodox and in the Russian Church, depriving other Catholics leaders to influence or express their views on the matter. Thus, the Holy See also presses for Ukrainians Catholics not influence the Orthodox issue in Ukraine, making the Sviatoslav's desire for unity more sensitive. Moscow withdrew the Join International Commission, of which the Ecumenical Patriarchate is a member, and choose to maintain with the papacy only bilateral relations.

          Since at least the 1960's, there has been a movement of Ukrainian Catholics for the elevation of the Greek Catholic Church to the status of Patriarchate. This would result in a strengthening of the national unity and, consequently, an approximation between Catholics and Orthodox in the country, increasing the chances of unity between the two churches. This at the expense of the Russian Church that, with the creation of the unified Ukrainian Orthodox Church on January 5th, lost religious jurisdiction over the country after 332 years. Therefore, a Catholic Patriarchate would further alienate Ukraine from Russia which, with the seizure of the Crimea and the promotion of a war in the neighboring country in 2014, is loosing the battle for the restoration of a Russian Empire with its oficial Church.

(Icon of Unity painted by an Orthodox monk from Mount Athos, Greece, in 1968.)

          Given the provisions, however cautious, of the new Ukrainian Patriarch Epiphanius I (to be enthroned on February 3rd) of collaborating in dialogue with Catholics, the enthusiastic commitment of Sviatoslav and the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I in ecumenical dialogue and the Ukrainian Catholics' desire per decades of elevating their church to the status of Patriarchate can open the doors to a unity of the churches. If this happen in the future, the consequences will be overwhelming (in a good sense), since Orthodox civilization was constructed over the spread of Christianity in the Slavic world, which would drag hundreds of millions of people into unity with the West. This would directly help the promotion of peace worldwide.

          This is a hard mission that, according to the Catholic tradition, can only be accomplished by the Holy Spirit's action.

* Published in Portuguese on January 21st, 2019.

Lithuania: KGB´s files reveal link with the Russian Church

(Kirill, Patriarch of the Russian Church, Putin and Medvedev.)

          On the 20th December, Lithuania has released some former KBS´s files (country was under Soviet rule from 1944 to 1991) which shows the institution´s link with the Moscow Patriarchate. Nowadays, there are some hierarchical members of the Russian Orthodox Church who have been (or are) involved with the Russian secret service, now called FSB, among them Metropolitan Alexandr of Riga, leader of the Latvian Orthodox Church linked to Moscow.

          Paul Goble says that in the Putin era the penetration of the secret service penetration into the Russian Church has increased aiming, he comments, of using ecclesial property to cover up it´s business. The church is also one of the ideological basis of the government, which stands as defender of traditional values and Christianity, seeking trying to expand it´s influence outside Russia.

        It must to be considered that the release of the files has come precisely in time of tension among Moscow, Kyiv and Constantinople around the formation of a new Ukrainian Orthodox Church, hitting the Russian Church´s imagem and thus helping in it´s demoralization among the Orthodox faithful. Given Lithuania´s history of opposition to Russia, the files´ opening at this time doesn´t seem a coincidence.

Martyrs, heroes and others not so saints: the construction of the new Russian identity

(Town of Kaluga, Russia)

The anthropologist and professor at the New Bulgarian University, Milena Benovska-Sabkova, has carried out a work on memory policy implemented in Russia in the religious revival context. Her activity had as reference the city of Kaluga, with 350 thousand inhabitans 150 km southwest Moscow, and has been published in various academical journals (here - page 95-98, here and, most complete, here).

With the end of the Soviet Union, a series of research began in order to reconstitut and rebuild the religious communities, churches and monasteries destroyed in Russia. Much of this work was done by so-called kraevedenie, researchers specializing in local history as cultural heritage, biographies and origins of families. Such a kind of researcher has emerged still in the time of the Soviet Union and actually has a semi-official status, acting independently and also with research centers, schools, churches and local authorities. Within this branche there are the church kraevedenie, who makes the same work, but focused especifically on religious matters, with emphasis on survey of demolished churches, research on religious files and biographical survey of clerics and religious people, especially those who desappeared in the Communist era.

Since 2000, with the Vladimir Putin´s arrival to Presidency of Russia, the activity of the kraevedenie has has gained great official stimulus: they were co-optated by the authorities to work in rescue research of Russian history acting in schools, museums and in local activties such as congresses and books launches. Thus, these reasearchers began to form a semiprofissional group related a) to the national project of memory policy, b) to the regional projects linked to the memory policy at national level, and c) to the spontaneous research acitvity carried out by their members. The church kraevedenie also entered this process, and began to work close to the Russian Orthodox Church´s authorities. Thus, they consolidated the role as intermediaries between the Orthodox clergy and the common citizen making a knowledge "bridge" between the two social groups.

(Optina Pustyn Monastery, in the town of Koselsk 60 km from Kaluga. Founded in the 15th century, the monastery is one of the main ones in Russia and also region´s religious center. It was transformed by the Bolsheviks in the Kraevedenie Museum in 1917-29, and later received a department of a Koselk´s museum in 1957.)

It´s through the close relationship between the kraevedenie and the Russian Orthodox Church that the religious revival takes place in Russia. They work together both at national level in the Synodal Commission of Canonization of Saints and at regional level, following the example of the Commission of Canonization of the Eparchy of Kaluga, where the anthropologist Milena carried out her research. Therefore, these researchers not only rescue the Orthodoxy´s past memory but also integrate the Church´s plan to reconstitute a national religious identity.

Since 1989, the Orthodox Church has carried out a series of canonizations, among them the confessors and "new martyrs", that is, the religious assassinated or dead during the communist regime. The church kraevedenie are of fundament importance mainly for rescuing files, survivors´ memories and to discover abandoned cemiteries in the old churches. Along them work the so-called "religious entrepreneurs" who commit some of their time and personal resources to carry out and organize religious processions, restore icons, restore and rebuild destroyed churchers and create the so-called "sacred places" for visitation, as the new memorial designed in Kaluga for the veneration of the new martyrs.

The memory policy in Russia also seeks to rehabilitate the civilians and militaries´ memory, especially soldiers killed in World War II. The so-called "Great Patriotic War" is considered, as Angelo Segrillo in the book "Os Russos" ("The Russians") comments, a moment of great trauma, meaning practically a refoundation of the country. It´s estimated that seven thousand cities have been destroyed and up to 27 million people have died in this event, of which 100 thousand only in the small district of Kaluga.

The kraevedenie are also involved in this secular historical rescue, mainly in the discovery and cataloging of the collective graves, activity that involves mainly military groups and war veterans. Milena comments that it´s through the indentification of the dead and a new decent funeral that there´s a "sacralization" of the soldiers, seen as heroes, civil "martyrs" of Russia. "The anonymous dead", the anthropologist says, "are transformed into heroes via personalization and 'proper burial'" (p. 20)

The new martyrs canonization and mainly the national heroes identification serve as a way of dealing with the traumatic past, not only of war but also of anti-religious persecution. Some of the kraevedenie who formed their academical life during the Soviet Union today have to deal with KGB´s files, where many of the crimes commited against religious people as murders, arrests and persecution are documented. The seemingly irreconcilable legacy of Communist terror against religious and ornidary citizens is transformed in a "positive" past through the heroes veneration and the martyrs canonization.

(Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, in Moscow, Russian Orthodox Church´s headquartes. It was destroyed by the Bolsheviks at the behest of Stalin´s, in 1931, and rebuild from 1990 during Yeltsin government. It was consacreated on August 19th 2000.) 

 

In the current Vladimir Putin administration (2013-2018), there´s a clear attempt by the Kremlin to approach and ideologically instrumentalize the discourses of the Orthodox Church´s upper clergy on the country´s history. This instrumentalization, that appears on Putin´s public statements, fosters the idea of Russia as a civilization distinct from the others, unique and origial, in opposition to the West. It would be through the return to it´s cultural roots and the rescue of the tradition that Russia could fulfill it´s role as power which is destined to be. Thus, all Russian history, including the Communist period, is considered "sacred" and necessary as part of an unique experience of a people distinct from the others. In Putin´s own words:

"Many people argue about the Lenin’s Tomb, saying that it does not follow tradition. What does not follow tradition? Just visit Kiev’s Pechersk Lavra or go to Pskov Monastery, or Mount Athos. You will see hallows of holy people there. Go ahead, you can see it all there. Therefore, the communists continued the tradition even in that respect and did it competently, in accordance with the demands of those times."

(Military parade in Moscow on Victory Day, celebrated on May 9th: Communist period rehabilitated as part of the Russia´s "sacred" history.)

It´s possible to see clearly in the Putin´s statement the memory policy carried out in his administration. This is why the official stimulus of a historical rescue and a value transformation of the Communist period, from where the Russia´s new martyrs and heroes were rescued. This policy covers part of the Russian Orthodox Church´s upper clergy, as well as Orthodox leaders and faithful called "fundamentalists" and nationalist groups. These last two nourish an extreme rejection to all the Western influences and demand canonization of proeminent civilian figures in the Russian history, includind the dictator Josef Stalin. The researcher Igor Torbakov of the Uppsala University, in Sweden, comments on this Russian government´s attemp of synthesizing the contradictions of the Russian history into a single narrative:

"In Frederick Corney’s words, 'Putin was offering a narrative of modern Russian history in which the turbulences of Russia’s past served merely as a backdrop to recent progress, an offer of reconciliation without truth.' [author´s highlight] As its support base consists of a broad coalition comprising heterogeneous social groups, the regime, in its quest for historical legitimacy, seeks to synthesize disparate elements of Russia’s different 'pasts' into a kind of eclectic fusion. 'It attempts to yoke, if uncomfortably, various idealized aspects of the tsarist, soviet and émigré pasts' and present this concoction as 'history without guilt or pain.'

The search for an indivisible truth, the fascination with the irrational, the hope to find a special path, a destiny, a mission granted by God and/or History are current discourses among Russian intellectuals in the post-Soviet era, amalgamating all events and ideological branches into a single body. Nothing more exemplary of this characteristics than Alexander Dugin´s Neo-Eurasian though, so often mentioned in this blog, or the extremely heterogenous composition of members and groups linked to the Putin´s United Russia Party.

Russia seeks for an absolute unity, a totality that unifies everything and everyone in a new national identity. The Moscow´s memory policy is one aspect of the attempt to rescue or create a new Russian identity unifying successes and traumas, heroes and martyrs, crimes and holiness acts and "saints" of all specters of  Russian society, even if they arent´s so saint thus.

* Published in Portugues on April 13th 2016.

Theotokos and the "Third Rome" myth



(Theotokos of Vladimir: there are many copies of the original throughout the world.)

Our Lady is much venerated in Orthodox Christianity and her presence in the faith and cultures of these peoples are very striking.

The most common Our Lady´s icon in Orthodoxy is Theotokos, which in Greek means "Mother of God". Russia, the country with the largest Orthodox population in the world, received from ancient Byzantium this aspect of Christianity, artistic tradition, the form of government and many elements governing social order. Historically the Russians called their land "House of the Most Holy Mother of God", a reference to the nation as the holder of a Christian heritage, in it´s view legitimate, and clearly expressed in the "Third Rome" myth developed from the late 15th century. Theotokos is the Russia´s protective patroness.

But what is the relationship between the Mother of God´s picture and the "Third Rome"?

In fact Theotokos is one of the elements of historical tales and philosophic texts that have helped to create or have been used to legimitate the ideia that Russia was legitimate heir of Byzantiun, the "Second Rome" (with the city of Rome the "first").

According to historian Andrew Wilson in his book "The Ukranians. Unexpected Nation", the Theotokos icon that is related to the legitimationz of the kings´ power of the ancient Kievan Rus was brought from Constantinople to the Kiev region in 1134, having been manufactured around 1120. The Virgin of Vyshhorod (town near Kiev), as it was known at the time, was one of the main symbols of the Kievan king´s divine authority. This same icon is now known as Our Lady of Vladimir, or Theotokos of Vladimir.

(Pechersk Monastery, in Kiev, one of the main religious centers throughout Orthodox world, state museum and Russian Orthodox Church headquarters in Ukraine.)

After the schism between Rome and Constantinople in 1054 that gave rise to the Catholic-Orthodox division there were some attempts to establish autocephalous, ie, autonomy of the local Orthodox churches in relation to Kiev Patriarchate. These initiatives originated already in the same century of the schism when divergences among "regional" Orthodox leaders and those more loyal to Kiev began.

(Dormition Cathedral in Vladimir, Russia, where Theotokos of Vladimir was taken.)

One of the division´s landmarks between a northern and a southern branch in Orthodoxy (and that in the future helped shape the identity distinction between Russia and Ukraine) was the Our Lady of Vyshorod´s capture by Kievan prince Bogoliubski in 1155 to the Dormition Cathedral in the city of Vladimir (and that would give a new name to icon). Bogoliubski tried to enthrone his protégé, Feodor, as city´s Metropolitan deepening the north-south divergences. Later Feodor was captured and taken to Kiev, beeing executed in 1169 probably for political and/or religious divergences. The icon´s theft and the prince´s attempt to enthrone an ally as a local Orthodox leader is a clear attempt to legitimaze Vladimir, in the north, as legitimate succesor of the Rus historical legacy removing these assigments from Kiev and making the city center of Slav Orthodoxy.

(Prince Bogoliubski, venerated in the Orthodox Church as a saint.)

The icon was trasnferred to the Moscow Kremlin in 1395, and it´s assigned to it the Moscovy principality´s victory in arresting the Mongol attack lead by Tamerlane. The city of Moscow, which led to the principality, has been founded by a "northerner", Yurii Dolgorukii, around 1150, which shows that from it´s origin this city and Kiev were in opposite poles on the legitimacy of the Kievan Rus´ legacy.

The shock of Constantinople´s fall in 1453 and the consequent attempt to legitimize the Moscovy´s new role were the main events that granted Russia the title of "Third Rome" and it´s Orthodoxy leadership claim. According to Wilson, the Russia sovereignty over "all Rus" would be and "invented tradition", thesis also held regarding of the Third Rome doctrine by the Harvard historian Marshall Tillbroke Poe.

Wilson states that this tradition is rooted in the transfer of the Our Lady of Vladimir icon to Moscow in 1395 and the first attempt by the King Simeon, the Proud, to take full control of the Orthodox Church of Rus. These events were aimed to make the kingdom guardion of Orthodoxy and the Kievan Rus legacy in the presence of Theotokos. The historian also lists some historical events that were decisive to the Muscovy´s power growth from 15th century: the Russian Orthodox Church autocephaly in 1448 fearing the Constantinople´s fall to the Muslims, the consequent rise of the Moscovite kingdom claims due this fall, and the final expulsion of the Mongols from the region in 1480. Soon after the establishment of the Church in Russia, the state began to publish a series of tales that legitimized the new Muscovy´s religious authority.

(Prince Ivan III, the firts of the Russian monarchs to receive the Filofei´s letters.)

In the late 15th century the Third Rome doctrine was circulating in Russian cities as Tver and Novgorod, and in the later the first expressed record of this term. It was from the reign of the Grand Prince of Muscovy, Vasili III (1505-1533), which started the penetration of the myth in the kingdom´s official circles. The first record that reaches the authorities comes from Filofei, monk from Pskov, near Moscow, who writes a series of letters for a Vasili´s representative in his city in 1523-24, to Vasili and then to his successor, Ivan IV, the Terrible. For the monk, Rome had fallen into heresy, and Constantinople had been punished by God with the Muslim rule in his attempt to unite the Orthodoxs with Rome at the Florence Council (1439). Thus Moscovy was the only rightful heir kingdom of Christianity and the natural Byzantium´s sucessor, since all other Christian kingdoms had fallen into enemies´ hands. According to Filofei, prophecies (of which he don´t indicate the source) state that there wouldn´t be a "Fourth Rome", being Muscovy with the mission of building an empire in order to protect and disseminate the true Christian Faith until the end of time. To fulfill this rule, the leader should be excepcionally skilled and inteligent able to guide the kingdom in an universal and escathological mission. Therefore, the king acted under inspiration of God himself, and his authority over the empire and his rule as church´s protector divinaly conferred. Muscovy bequeathed the Byzantium´s "divine authority", then Constantinople´s protector.

The "Third Rome" idea appears at first in an official text in 1547 at the Ivan IV´s coronation as Czar of Russia, which meaning is "Caesar", what gave to the leader imperial projection. The coronation´s text was written or inspired by then Metropolitan Makary, one of the Third Rome doctrine formulators at the time. In 1589, five years after Ivan´s death, the Russian Orthodox Church was elevated to Patriarchate in an agreement which Moscow left prevailed on Constantinople, since this was under Muslim occupation and depended of Russian resources.

(Saint Basil Cathedral in Red Square in Moscow, ultimate symbol of Russia, next to Spasskaya, the main tower at the Kremlin´s walls.)

With the taking of Kazan, capital of the khanate opponent of Russia, Ivan IV ordered the construction of the Saint Basil Cathedral, in Moscow, now the main symbol of the country. It´s oficial name carries the Theotokos´ identity: it calls Cathedral of the Most Holy Theotokos of the Moat. It´s structure forms a eight point star, number symbol of the Christ ressurrection. The star is also a reference to the Star of Bethlehem which guided the Magi to Jesus and the New Jerusalem as the guide of humanity. The Third Rome myth also calls Moscow New Jerusalem, a reference to it´s sacredness. The city´s urbanization centered on the Red Square and the Kremlin clearly shows, in the architectural plan, Moscow as guide of Russia and all Orthodoxy (see page 95).

After the Ivan´s reign, the Third Rome myth circulated only among Orthodox religious, especifically the staroveri, or "old belivers", religious group that denies as heretical the modernizing reform of the Russian Church in 18th century, there was no mention of the docrtine in state documents. The Russian kingdom (and later Empire) expanded without official references to the original messianism. Only in the mid-19th century the "Third Rome" returned to the intellectuals´ voices, especially from the 1860s with the publications of the Filofei´s letters. No coincidentally Alexander Dugin, main Kremlin´s ideologist and responsible for the Russian geopolitics redesign on messianic bases, considers the old belivers the keepers of the true Orthodox tradition and, therefore, of legitimate spiritual tradition of the Russian people.

The great popularization of the Third Rome myth led many intellectuals to promote a national mission, a specifically Russian messianism, like the Soloviev´s Christian universalism. The spread and rise of communism found resonance of it´s eschatological mission among intellectuals of the time, and until recent decades other movements emerged offering to Russia a new mission in the world, the conquest of Eurasia, the Artic and even space.

After dwelling for centuries the Dormition Cathedral inside the Moscow Kremlin, Theotokos was removed for restauration in the Bolshevik period and is now kept at State Tretyakov Gallery. Although no longer within the Kremlin´s walls, it still enjoys state protection. Legitimate or not, the Mother of God´s Picture, Our Lady of Vladimir, is still linked to the Russian power, which still believes having to fulfill a mission in the world, whether divine or human.

* Published in Portuguese on March 2nd 2016.