Russian mercenaries in Venezuela

(Russian mercenaries of the Slavonic Corps, in Syria.)

          Russian mercenaries of the Wagner Group, who have acted in Syria and Ukraine, arrived to Caracas aiming of securing the safety of Nicolás Maduro and other senior Venezuela's authorities. The report in English was initially disclosed, on January 25th, by Reuters Agency, but a survey by the Jametown Foundation showed that, indeed, the mercenaries were sent from Moscow, passing through Dakar (Senegal), Ciudad del Leste (Paraguay) and Havana (Cuba), before arriving to the Venezuelan capital by a comercial flight on 22nd. The semmingly erratic trip's trajectory raises the hypothesis that it was planned for not raising suspicions.

          According to Jamestown, Russian mercenaries arrived in Venezuela as early as May 2018, before the current political crisis, which bean in January with Maduro's inauguration for a new term as president. The new group of combatants was, therefore, added to those already in the country. There would be up to 400 new mercenaries.

          Two days after the news on Reuters, several media outlets reported that Moscow denied sending these mercenaries. Jamestown comments, however, that in general the Russian authorities' reaction have been denial or silence on the matter. On January 23rd, the Kremlin's spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, admitted that Russian private security companies operated in Sudan and came into contradiction with the Russian ambassador in the country, who in November 2018 had denied the fact. This lapse may be an indication that Russia seeks to keep silence on mercenaries hired by the government on behalf of state interests. There are Russian private companies also operating in Gabon and Central African Republic, as Coda agency has learned in detail.

          As I commented in the last post, Russia has much to lose with the fall of Maduro´s government, which is increasingly isolated internationally, but has explicit support, in addition to the Russians, China and Turkey. The government's fall would be the loss of contracts for large Russian companies, money for non-payment of loans (which Maduro have had difficulties to pay) and especially a space of political and military influence in a region close to the US. A geopolitical adversary besides Washington means the Moscow's triumph in its commitment for the corrosion of the US global leadership. Hence the dispute between of the two countries around Venezuelan crisis.

          So far, Moscow has given no indication that will send military personnel to Venezuela on the possibillity, even small, of a Washington's military intervention. While accusing the US of promoting, with its allies, a coup d'etat in Venezuela and a potential bloodshed, Russia seeks to antecipate itself to a social convulsion or even a foreign intervation using paid percenaries. At least for now.

* Published in Portuguese on January 30th, 2019.

Russia declares support for Maduro. What now?

(Putin receiving Maduro in his official residente near Moscow, on December 5th, 2018. Promise of political support.)

          Amid Venezuela's severe social, political and economic crisis, Vladimir Putin has called for President Nicolas Maduro to express support to his authority as country's president. Several countries around the world, such as US, Canada, France and Brazil, declared they don't recognize Maduro's new term and has considered Juan Guaidó, National Assembly's president, as the legitimate President in charge.

          In the message, Putin stated that "the worsening of the internal political crisis" is "provoked from outside the country", in allusion, although not exclusive, to the US, and that this interference is a "gross violation" of international law. 

          Noting the votes at the UN, international alliances and statements of Moscow and Washington, mainly after Russia annexed the Crimea and started to sponsor a war in eastern Ukraine, its clear that Venezuela is an ally of the Russians and serves as a Kremlin's space of presence in a region traditionally influenced by the US.

          Last December, Russia sent two Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjacks bombers to Venezuela to carry out military exercises with the local armed forces, where they stayed from day 10 to 14. On day 12, they performed aerial maneuvers lasting 10 hours over the Caribbean Sea. The Tu-160s were introduced in November 2017 and were designed to realize more than 10 thousands kilometers flights being capable to carry nuclear warheads.

          The bomber's presence in Venezuela was a double message to the US, which recently abandoned a treaty over nuclear warheads singed with the Soviets in 1987 (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Traty, INF, which Trump claimed of being violated several times by the Russians) and has being raising the tone of criticism against Maduro's dictatorial government. It may also be a response to the support given to Ukraine by the Americans in the Kerch Strait crisis in November 2018. Secondarily, its also a message to Jair Bonsonaro's Brazil, the largest country in Latin America, which has been a harsh critic of Caracas and seeks an alignment with Washington.

(Tupolev Tu-160)

          There's also the possibility of Russia establishing a military base in the Venezuelan island of La Orchila, in the Caribbean Sea, what would ensure permanent presence of troops in the region and would supplant logistic difficulties, such as displacement and supply of aircrafts such as Tu-160. Although Russian interest in the place is more than then years old and this possibility is unclear, a base in La Orchila would imply in a change in US-led military security in the Americas.  

          The Russian presence is also a way of reaffirming its aliance with Caracas. Between 2016 and 2017, Moscow lent at least U$ 17 billion to Venezuela, and in December 2018 (when Maduro met Putin) promised U$ 6 billion more in investment in oil industry and gold exploration. Such debts are in part paid with oil and the participation of Russian state-owned Rosneft in Venezuelan PDVSA's businesses. In the political field, Maduro has been a staunch Moscow's supporter is its geopolitical actions, such as in Ukraine and neighbouring countries.

          The question that remains in these tension days for the Venezuelans is: will Russia act before the treat of a possible Maduro's downfall? In a tense moment, the possibility of Caracas asking Moscow for a last-minute help stays open since, such as Putin's phone call showed, if the current political crisis is caused by a foreign intrvention would be legitimate for other foreigners (the Russians) to come in denfense of Maduro. In addition, the Russians have much to lose with a possible government's downfall, not only money and contracts, but also a possible mid-term military presence in the Caribbean Sea, region traditionally influenced by Washington. The picture that hasn't been seen in the Americas since the 1962 Missile Crisis could repeat, albeit to a lesser extent than the tension which almost led the world to a nuclear war.

* Published in Portuguese on January 24, 2019.

Agreement between Greece and Macedonia is contrary to Russia. But what does Moscow has to do with this?

(Prime Ministers Zoian Zaev, of Macedonia, and Alexis Tsipras, of Greece, watch the foreign ministers signing the Prespa Agreement.)

        Everything indicates that the relationship between Greece and Russia has worsened in recent months. The cause would be the Prespa Agreement, which the Greeks made with Macedonia, and its effects to the region's geopolitics, traditionally influenced by the Russians for at least two hundred years. 

          The Prespa Agreement, signed on June 17th, 2018, resolved a dispute between Greece and Macedonia over the latter's name. Athens complained that the nomenclature was a reference to the historical region north of its territory on the border with Macedonia, and there could be claim from neighbors as to ownership of the site. With the Agreement, the country will have to take a series of administrative measures and will be called Republic of North Macedonia.

          Indeed, the small Balkan country could claim to join into the UE and NATO, becoming the military alliance's 30th member. The late country to join the alliance was small Montenegro, in April 2017, with the US support. The non-blocking of Macedonia's entry into these two organizations is the only Greek compromise in the agreement.

          That's where the problem lies between Greece and Russia. NATO is the main Moscow's military adversary, and it was the agreement closed with Greece that made viable the Macedonia's entry. Due to the name dispute, Athens had been blocking the Skopje's entry into both NATO and the European Union.  

          Just before making his trip to Serbia on January 17th, Vladimir Putin said the deal was achieved through political pressure. In this case, by the West. This in a country whose democratic regime is still fragile. And that entry into NATO should bring more instability in an already unstable region. Its not necessary to repeat here that the Kremlin's main headache is the Western military alliance. Any organization's movement provokes reaction on the other side. And vice versa. 

          To keep in mind the sensitivity of the region in the dispute between NATO and Russia, let us recall the Montenegro's cause that I commented in this blog. From September 2015 until at least May 2016, various protests erupted in Montenegro against the government, who then pleaded for NATO entry. Demonstrators complained this plan, as well as the curtailing freedom of the press, lack of democracy and calling for resignation of then-Prime Minister Mila Djukanovic, who has been in power for more than twenty years. The main opposition leaders were favorable of a closeness to Russia, and went to Moscow to seek for political support for the change of government. They promised to end the the economic sanctions against the Russians and making Montenegro a "neutral" country between a Serbia allied of Moscow and European countries linked to NATO and the EU. 

          On October 16th, 2016, Djukanovic suffered a coup attempt. Some of its perpetrators were arrested. Some group's members were Russians and/or fled to Russia. Besides the great tension, Montenegro joined NATO in April 2017.

          Returning to Greece, discomfort with Russia caused Greeks Independent party's departure from the government coalition composed with Syria bloc of the Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. An unusual alliance, given IG is a party with a fascist profile and the Syriza a left and far-left bloc.

          As I commented in two postings in June 2015 (here and here - in Portuguese), the Kremlin was one of those responsible for sewing the alliance and considered Tsipras a staunch Russia's ally. A list of factors linked Athens to Moscow: the government elected in January 2015 closed a gas sale agreement with Gazprom in February and agreed to extend the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, from the same company, until Greece in June; in 2016, Syriza voted against the EU's economic sanctions against Moscow in the European Parliament; in 2013, Alexander Dugin was in Greece for a lecture invited by the future Greek foreign minister, Niko Kotzias, calling to make Greece a Russia's means of influence in the European bloc, and in another occasion he suggested the name of Tsipras for the Greek government.

          Konstantin Malofeev, an oligarch promoter of the Kremlin's foreign policy and under the economic sanctions of the EU, was the financier of Dugin's contacts in Greece. One of the Independent Greeks' deputy was head of Greek-Russian Alliance, an organization dedicated to promoting the relations between the two countries. Both Tsipras and IG's members have been in Russia several times promising to lift the economic sanctions and promote an alliance with Moscow.

          Therefore, Greece's agreement with Macedonia not only went against the history of closeness between Greeks and Russians, as it hit the government coalition and the Kremlin's plan for Europe. Again, the pivot of all history was the great Russian adversary, the main barrier to the Eastern forces, NATO.     

* Published in Portuguese on January 17th, 2018.

Trump, partner of Russia? Ask the Germans

(Consortium Nord Stream AG's headquarters in Zug, Switzerland.)

          According to UK´s The Times, US government has warned German companies that they may be target of US economic sanctions. The cause is participation in Nord Stream 2 project, a 1.200 km gas pipeline accross the Baltic Sea that will double the natural gas import from Russia by Germany. Running alongside the existing Nord Stream, the country could receive up to 111 billions gas cubic meters per year, double its current capacity.

          The 9,4 billion euros project is run by Russia state-owned Gazprom and its promoted by the consortium Nord Stream AG, which has as Chairman of the Shareholders' Comittee German former prime-minister Gerhard Schöreder, Vladimir Putin´s personal friend. The consortium was created in 2005 with aim of constructing this gas pipeline.

          The warning of sanctions was given by the US embassador in Berlim who, according to the report, warned that "companies involved in Russian energy exports are taking part in something that could prompt a significant risk of sanctions", in addition of undermining the security of Ukraine and Europe. A new gas pipeline to Europe would allow Moscow cut off gas supply that passes through Ukraine, country in armed conflict with pro-Russian separatists. 

          In the words of an US official, the Washington´s warning is a "clear message of US policy".

(Nord Stream - in green - and Nord Stream 2 - in yellow dotted.)

          This agrees with what I commented in my last post: Trump administration isn't as close to Russia as it seems. Academic, political consultant and journalist Taras Kuzio, expert in Russian and Ukrainian politics, commented is his Twitter on January 14th that "US threatening German firms building gas pipe shows again that the Trump administration (despite its many idiosyncrasies) is a stronger ally of Ukraine than the EU".

        As expected, Poland and the Baltic States are very troubled with the Russian-German project. The latter consider Nord Stream 2 to be a political, not an economic, project which aims to increase Europe's dependence on Russian gas, and gives to Moscow capacity to politically influence the continent.

          Throughout 2019, however, Angela Merkel denfended the gas pipeline construction, whose position seems to have changed by the ende of the year due many criticism and pressure from supporters, opponents and Western allies. Trump has accused Merkel of being "captive" towards Russians.

          More than the White House's idiosyncrasies and alleged Trump's "collusion" with Russia, the threat to European security comes mainly from the energy dependence from Russia and the cooperation agreements the Kremlin has constructed with various political parties and activists in the continent.            

* Published in Portuguese on January 15th, 2019.

Trump, partner of Russia? Notes on Anne Applebaum´s article

(Trump and Putin at Helsinki summit, on July 16th, 2018.)

          In the last post, I commented on the deepening of the integration between Russia and Belarus, making the later more dependent on Moscow, away from the Western countries. I used as base an article by US journalist and historian Anne Applebaum written in The Washinton Post on January 4th.

          The Applebaum´s text gave reasons for the Western countries to pay more attention to Russia´s moves towards Belarus, which they haven´t done, citing as main example the Trump´s stance. His government would have gave up US´s historical commitment to a united and free Europe (a clear allusion to his scorn for the European Union) and he would be helping to disseminate informations that collaborate for Russian propaganda on many issues, such as events (without specifying them) involving Montenegro and Afghanistan. Trump administration would have given a strange attention to a non-existent invasion plan of Belarus by Poland, for example, widely publicized by Russian media. In Applebaum´s words, the US president is "inclined to see the Russia´s point of view on most issues".

          Following Applebaum´s posts in Twitter, one realizes that the journalist and historian is a harsh critic of Trump. There is nothing unusual and wrong on this, but watching Western analysts by the same media, practically of them are harsh critics, if not mockers, on the US president. This makes more difficult a cold analysis and calls into question the alleged impartiality of the sources.      

          The US stance on Russia is seen as negative when the president addresses directly to the Russian colleague. The analyst see this, with some reason, as a caring and undeserved treatment to Putin. But let´s look at some points: early in Trump´s turn, former US diplomat in the UN, Nikki Halley, firmly stated that the US would not lift the economic sancations against Russia while it don´t give Crimea back to Ukraine. This was also the position of the US president himself. His former Secretary of Defense, Jame Mattis, was a staunch supporter of NATO, military alliance which have been the Kremlin´s main headache for more than 20 years. Furthermore, on April 11th, 2017, Trump supported the Montenegro´s entry into the aliance, and in September 2018 he still considered setting up an American military base in Poland, for displeasure of the Russians. Not only Poland, but the Baltic countries are in favor of the US presence in the region. They knew the Russian domain in Communist times and don´t want it back, nor as a possibility.

(Anne Applebaum)

          If we compare Trump´s action with his predecessor, the opposition to Russia becomes clearer. In September 2009, the Obama government gave up the anti-missile shield project in Europe launched by his predecessor, George W. Bush, on the allegation of a nuclear treat from Iran. It so happens that Iran haven´t nuclear weapons to date. The shield was clearly a defense against Russia. But a similar initiative nowadays would generate a much more aggressive reaction from Moscow, as seen in the military tensions between Russia and NATO in the second half of 2016. Obama also withdrew troops from Iraq in 2011, which would have helped the emergence and expansion of ISIS, now acting only in Syria. On the exit of the Americans from Syria decided by Trump, the impact is much less important even this helps in Russia´s consolidation in the country, whose troops have been acting since September 2015. At the annual press conference in December, Putin made clear that regards Syria as his area of influence. He stated that the presence of the US troops in the country were "illegitimate" and classified their departure as a "right decision". The US, however, continues to have a physical presence in Iraq, maintains the alliance with Saudi Arabia and has strengthened political support of Israel. In the Obama administration, there was significant worsening of the relationships with Saudis and Israelis.   

        Contrasting with the friendly words, Trump hasn´t been so condescending to Putin in fact. By the contrary: NATO´s military strengthening, guaranteeing alliances in the Middle East, and maintaining sanctions against Russia, crucial issues to curb Russia´s projection in the world, restricts the Moscow´s global action. Remains to know whether the new Secretary of Defense, Patrick Shanahan, and the new UN diplomat, a little savvy Heather Nouert (a post temporarily occupied by Jonathan Cohen since January 1st), will follow the same policy.
       
          Criticism such as Anne Applebaum´s are legitimate, but, more important than White House´s speeches and diatribes, the main issue is what is actually happening, de facto policy, mainly in economic and military matters, two of the mais Achilles´ heel of Russia. If Trump is successful in strengthening the US in the long run (the economy is booming, for example), less space will remain for Russia in the international arena. Putin´s plan to re-establish the Russian superpower and re-create its Empire depends, mainly, of taking this post from US. As we saw in the Cold War, the world was too small for two superpowers, and for the Kremlin the Cold War isn´t over.            

* Published in Portuguese on January 10th, 2019.

Moscow turns to Belarus

(Flags of Belarus and Russia.)

          In her column in The Washington Post on January 4th, Anne Applebaum tries to draw attention to recent moves that Russia has made vis-à-vis its neighbor to the west, Belarus. According to the US journalist and historian, Moscow´s imperial ambition has turned to Minsk, and some of this signals would be the possibility of the Russians take over some services of the Belarussian government as customs, visa, and monetary and tax policies. Such measures would be part of a greater project of integration of the two countries´ economy. 

          The country´s president, Alexander Lukashenka, met Putin on 6 and 25 December and, in a sign of political rapprochement, exchanged public New Year´s congratulation with his colleague. In his message, Putin said that the union between the two countries created by the treaty which established the Union State of Russia and Belarus in 1999 has been a success. Since the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, Lukashenka has distanced himself from Moscow and has tried to design a more independent foreign policy approaching to Europe. Russia, for its part, has sought to avoid distancing of Belarus and consolidate its influence in the surrounding countries. 

          On December 28th, Russian Prime Minister, Dmitri Medvedev, signed a decree that created a committee to work on integration between the two countries. The committee will be chaired by the Russian Economic Development Minister, Maxim Oreshkin. This signs a deepening of the relationship and, consequently, a greater linkage of Belarus to its most powerful neighbor.

   

          As I commented in the end of December, Belarus has given recent signals of detachment from Russia, such as Lukashenka´s statement that he will refer to the neighbour country not as a "fraternal state", but as a "partner", and the statement that no foreign military bases are needed in his country, including Russian ones. He also said that Belarus will never be part of Russia. Moscow´s reaction, therefore, isn´t surprising. As Applebaum recalls, Putin´s popularity is falling, and force demonstrations abroad, such as the wars in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, renew the Kremlin´s political capital, and reaffirm Russian power to the world.

          Finally, Applebaum recalls that the West has given less and less relevance to Minsk, and this lack of interest could encourage Moscow´s actions in a movement to absorb the neighbouring country. Its not appropriate here to analyze this possibility which has been suggested for some Western experts, but given the Putin government´s history this possibility isn´t null. I refer to the Russian politics reorganization since 2000 with a increasingly centralizing power, the aggressive actions abroad since the Russian president has resumed the post in 2012, and the strong influence of the Eurasian Movement in the military and political elite of Russia which wishes the creation of an imperial power. 

          The country´s current crisis and public discontent with the government´s plan of reforming social security announced, not by chance, during the World Cup are additional factors that could stimulate Kremlin´s actions abroad. Even if Luklashenka says to guarantee otherwise, the lack of strength and economic and energetic dependence on the Russians give him limited room of maneuver.

          Since assuming the presidency on the last day of 1999, Putin has tried to rebuild the Russian power and reestablish its Empire. This indicates the need of gaining not only power, but also terrain. Literally.       

Putin: promise of support (and the need) of the BRICS

(7th BRICS Conference in Ufa, Russia. July 2015.)

          On the last day of 2018, Vladimir Putin sent New Year´s messages to the presidents of the four BRICS countries, Brazil, India, China and South Africa. In the messages, promises were made to maintain strategical cooperation with each one of them as well as the bloc´s joint cooperation in the international organizations. 

          Emphasis on bilateral cooperation was given to China. Putin said the partnership between the two countries is at an "unprecedented level". With GDP expected to grow only 1,7%, a partnership with the world second-largest economy with a growth rate around 6% is key. Its worth to remember that in July 2014, Russia and China made U$ 400 billion deal for the sale Russian natural gas to the Asian giant. In times of tension with the Western countries and the inflow of liquefied gas from US to Europe since April 2016, Russia leans to Asia searching for support and money.

          As for Brazil, there may be changes in the relationship with Russia. Putin also send New Year´s congratulations to the new president-elect, Jair Bolsonaro. But Bolsonaro has indicated, on several occasions throughout his campaign, the intention of approaching the US and Israel. The choice of the new chancellor, Ernesto Araújo, a strong supporter of a pro-Western policy, as his article "Brazil in the boat of Ulisses" (in portuguese) makes clear, should mean, if not some distancing, at least a displeasure for Moscow. Alexander Dugin, founder of the Eurasian Movement and the most influential thinker in Russia´s military and political circles, stated in Facebook that Bolsonaro is a "ultra-liberal authoritarian" and that supports the left in Brazil, explaining in another post that it is a non-globalist left. This indicantes a possible rejection of the new president by the Kremlin.

          In the last years, the BRICS has shown opposition to the US and the Western attitudes in the global arena. Russia, China and Brazil (up to the Dilma government) have been the main actors in this regard. Brazil´s new role in the world is still open, but for Russia regions such as Asia and Europe have greater relevance, particularly the military partnership with China and its gigantic commodity market.

          

Belarus: ally of Russia, but not so much

(Putin of Rússia, Lukashenka of Belarus, and Poroshenko of Ukraine.)

          In recent years, Belarus has shown signal of ditachment from Russia, mainly since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, not recognized by the Minsk government, at the same time as it has sought a rapproachement to the West. The official position is to search for a more independent foreign policy, not so much tied to Moscow.

          On 27th December, an economist from Belarus State University warned of possibility of the Weatern countries creating a movement against Moscow and install a pro-Western government in Minsk. These countries would be politically and financially promoting people comitted to this agenda. This narrative is common among members and supporters of the Russian government, who seek, some times in a deribelately exaggerated way, for a "fifth column" in their territory. The background of the argument, as expected, the wave of protests that in February of 2014 toppled president Yanukovich, in Ukraine, and gave way to the rise of the Pietro Poroshenko´s pro-Western government.

          In another episode on last 24th, the country´s president, Alexander Lukashenka, said he would refer to Russia not as a "fraternal state", but only as a "partner", which in the Russian political language is a much more vague term of varied interpretation. According to him, its like the Russians see his country. Although its only rhetorical, the words coming from a leader in power since 1994 indicate a Minsk´s tendency to distance himself from Moscow. Lukashenka has accumulating a number of pronouncements in this sense. 

       
          Russia, however, regards Belarus a key neighbor, given the possibility of expanding it´s political and military action to the Europe´s borders, as it was exemplified by the Zapad, a major military training conducted in September 2007 just in Western Belarus, near the border with Poland. At that time, up to 100 thousand soldiers of both countries were deployed. Despite this sort of cooperation, the Lukashenka government resists the idea of permanent presence of foreign troops in its territory, also referring to Russia, which plans a military base in the neighboring territory.

          Despite Belarus being culturally very similar to Russia and dependent on its commercial products, especially natural gas, in recent years Lukasehnka has shown not so faithful to his most powerful partner. Its a few safe position for a small country that has by its side a giant that militarily occupies three of its neighboring countries.                    

Russian Conservative Forum: Russia´s messianic tradition and conservative estrategy

          The picture above is the logo of the International Russian Conservative Forum, an event that brought together European political leaders in Russia in 2014 and 2015. At the center Our Lady carries Baby Jesus in her arms over the Bizantine symbol of the two-headed eagle. The eagle was adopted by the Grand Duke of Moscovy, Ivan III, and represents the union between spiritual and temporal power of Russia. The kingdom, which would become the Russian Empire during the reign of Ivan IV, the Terrible, atributted to itself the Bizantine Empire´s legacy. The Bizantines developed the harmony concept, the perfect marriage between Church and State, represented by the eagle´s two head united to the same body. At the proclamation and coronation of Ivan IV as czar in 1547, the rite openly declared that Russia was the "Third Rome", transforming the doctrine which circulated among Slavic kingdoms at least a century before as an element of the State power. And it was necessary that a "God-elected autocrat" to firmly govern his kingdom to fulfill it´s eschatological role. Russia was destined by God to protect and guide Christendom, which would have been betrayed by Rome´s heresy with the 1054 schism and defeated at Constantinople by the Muslims in 1453. God was source of his legitimicy, which would be susteined until the Revolution of 1917.

          To the feet of the two-headed eagle there are on one side the scepter, symbol of authority, and on the other the globe. The allusion in clear: Russia has the divine role not only to guide Christendom, but the whole world, the whole creation. Hence the figure of the sun background, the light, God, source of all things and under which all things submit. The sun holds and bless whole creation, having Russia the authority over the world as protector and guide of the Christendom. Lastly, Our lady, who is the main intercessor to God in Christianity and for whom the Russian Orhodox Christianity has particular and deep devotion, presents herself as the link between Russia represented by the eagle behind her and God who is in her arms in the Person of Jesus          

          The sinthesys of the picture is the world leadership by Russia, political and espiritual authority of the world, guided by God through the hands of Our Lady. 

          The International Russian Conservative Forum already has in his name it´s claim: to be Russian and international at the same time, highlighting the Russia´s role in leading a new world order built over the debris of the current order. When hosting an event of this, the country is assuming this role, following the example of the statement on the Forum´s mission:

"We see how many Euro-Atlantic countries really took the way of rejecting theirs roots, including Christian values which form the basis of Western civilization. Moral principles against any tradition identity - national, cultural, religious or even sexual. There is a policy that places a family and a homosexual union on the same level, [as if] faith in God or faith in Satan [were equivalent]. The excesses of the politically correct go so far that they are seriously discussing the creation of events aimed in propagating pedophilia. In many European countries people are ashamed or afraid to talk about their religious affiliation. The holidays can be cancelled or are presented as something embarrasing, hiding the essence of these holidays, their moral basis. And this model is trying to impose itself aggressively to everyone, the whole world. We are convinced that this is a straight path to degradation and primitivization, a deep demographic and moral crisis. What else can be evidence of a moral crisis if not the loss [of the population´s] capacity for self-reproduction [?]. An today almost all depeloped countries cannot grow even with the help of migration. Without the values established in Christianity and other world religions, without the moral norms that have been formed through thousands of years, people will inevitably lose human dingity. And we consider natural and correct to protect these values."* 

          Following this statement, the Forum´s website continues with a Vladimir Putin´s speech to the participants of the Valdai Club, in September 2013, where the President defends traditional values, says the State could be a partner in this defense and alerts to the threat of the loss of Western countries´ sovergnity. The Valdai Club is a think-thank linked to the Kremlin and turned to Russia´s foreign policy research, and every year it receives Putin´s participation.

(A meeting of the Forum in Saint Petersburg, Russia, March 21-22, 2015. This was the most publicized Forum´s photo by Western media.)

          The Forum´s mission is to create a new concept of human development in response to Western liberalism, integrate conservative political organizations and to strenghten comercial, cultural and spiritual ties historically established between Russia and Europe. Taken as a scientific congress, it´s target audience are Russian and foreign public, political and patriotic organizations, representatives of regional, national governents and universities, Russian scientists, experts in History, Sociology, Demography, Law, Economics, Finances and members of industry. The intention is to influence political and social organizations in Russia and abroad, as well as public figures from the areas mentioned above, writers and public personalities.

          The 2015 event took place on March 21-22th at Holiday Inn Hotel, in Saint Petersburg, and was organized by the Russian National Cultural Center - People´s House, organization dedicated in promoting Russian culture. The initiative came from Rodina party, of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin. According to an official statement from the British government, members of right and far-right from Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Italy, United Kingdom and Sweden has attended the meeting. There wasn´t, however, participation of politicians of the Russian government. Participants were mainly political parties and military and political leaders who align themselves with the Forum´s proposal, such as Ataka from Bulgaria, Golden Dawn from Greece, Fuerza Nuova from Italy and the European political organization Alliance for Peace and Freedom. (Freedom Party from Austria, which had signed a cooperation agreement with Putin´s United Russia and had confirmed it´s presence at the Forum decided at last minute not to go.) These parties have simpathy for Russia and the Kremlin´s leadership. Among the Forum´s participants there was also people of neo-Nazi and antissemitic profile.

          In the end of the meeting was published the Participant´s Resolution, that begins with the declaration of regret to the destruction of "tradition European values". The text presents seven points defended by the members: 1) the creation of a "free, multipolar, progressive world order" (main Forum´s objective), the defense of the countries´ sovereignty and conservatism as the best form of existing social activity; 2) promoting, through the parties and the European Parliament, Christian values and propagate them to the masses, improving relations with the West and the end of the "Cold War" promoted against Russia; 3) the creation of a collective security system in Europe outside NATO, which became a tool of a dictadorship, departure of US troops from the continent and rejection of interventions by Western forces in other countries; 4) Russia is the legitimate successor of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire and now it´s integral part of the European traditions and it´s extended family; 5) Europe and Russia have their own path and must be freed from the US power. The main example of this is the conflict in Ukraine, that Forum sees as an internal problem, but considers that part of it´s territory was artificially separeted from Russia, is inhabited by Russians and asks the West to stop supporting Kiev gonverment; 6) the condenation of the sanctions against Russia and that also undermines Europe, and the desire to estimulate trade between the two regions to turn them back again into the center of humanity´s progress; 7) finally, the most important task is to estimulate the population growth by returning population to traditional values, and also intervene more rapidly to improve people´s urban life and health. The Resolution ends by asking participant organizations to act in a coordinated way to achieve these goals.

          The document sometimes repetes that the Forum´s members are "conservatives" and in the objectives it´s clear the references to the Russia´s special role in the world (the Russia-Europe duality repeatedly mentionated reinforce this idea).

          The fact that the Forum use a logo of strong religious load doesn´t necessarely means the divinization of the event or it´s messianic pretension (the same could be said, for example, about the flag of my country, Brazil, whose Positivist motto "Ordem e Progresso" - Order and Progress - inscribed in it doens´t makes this country and active agent in promoting Positivist philosophy through world, which promisses a new age of peace and progress for mankind). However, it´s symbology and performance is inserted into Russia´s messianic tradition. As I´ve commented in other post in this blog, today´s Russia continues to reproduce this tradition aiming to create a new world order over the rubble of the actual one. Whether under tzars´ divine authority, under the divinization of the Party and Communist triunphalism or under eschatology of the present Eurasian Movement, Russian messianism remains alive in planetary political projects focused in the formation of a new humanity, a new world created in the image and likeness of it´s social planners

          The International Russian Conservative Forum is only one of the Kremlin´s various investiments to achive this goal. It´s strategy is revealed in the conservative and nationalist narrative where elements of revolutionary tradition (anti-conservative, therefore) are mixed up, such as fascists, neo-Nazis and right-wing extremist, whose common point isn´t exaclty in values, but pro-Russia and anti-US feeling. The ignorance of this event´s mission by the great majority of people shows that this isn´t a plan with peoples´ consent, muche less of divine one.

* Translated from Russian to Portuguese with Google Tradutor with adpatations by the author, and to English by the author.

** Published in Portuguese on October 13th, 2017.

The language as link of a nation: Russia and the Russian world.

(T-shirt with Byzantine symbol of the two-headed eagle, the Russia´s map with the national flag and the country´s name written in Russian: unifying symbols of the nation.)



          Last July 20th, Russian president Vladimir Putin made a pronouncement at the Presidential Council on Inter-Ethnical Issues in Yoshkar-Ola, capital of the small republic of Mari El, about the inter-ethnic relations in the country. The republic has about 700 thousand people, being around 47% of Russians and 43% of the mari ethnic group, whose descendentes belongs to the Finno-Ugric people originating from the Northern and Eastern Europe and that have interaction with Russian ethnicity.         

(Putin at the Presidential Council on Inter-Ethnical Issues meeting, in Yoshkar-Ola, July 20th, 2017.)

          According to the US analyst Paul A. Golbe, expert on ethnic and religious issues of Eurasia, in his speech Putin stated that all ethnic non-Russians should learn the Russian language, while ethnic Russians shouldn´t be forced to learn the language of the republics in which they live and which are culturally characterized by the predominant ethnic group. Goble takes a critical stance on this speech stating it applies two-and-a-half measures with regard to the ethnic status of the groups that make up Russia, privileging ethnic Russians to the detriment of other ethnic groups and stimulating the national passions of both sides.

          Golbe transcripts the Putin´s commentary, who says: “Russian language forus is the state language, the language of inter-ethnic communication, and it cannot be replaced by anything else. It is the natural spiritual skeleton of all our multi-national country. Everyone msut know it … The languages of the peoples of Russia are also an inalienable aspect of the unique culture of the peoples of Russia.” The speech is clear: Russia has a peculiar, unique culture whose multinational unity is woven by the language, the center, the main structure of it´s culture. According to Putin, the non-Russians languages are not property of the State as the Russian language is, but belong to their respective peoples. The Constitution guarantees their study, but voluntarily and not mandatory like the mother tongue. “To force someone to study a language which is not his native tongue is impermissible”, said the President. The exception is the Russian, mandatory in all whole country.

          According to Golbe, Putin treated non-Russians cultures from the perspective of turism and public events, so that the Russians could get to know another cultures, noting that the development and popularization of these regions are of extremely importace given that Russia "is unique in the multiplicity of it´s nature and national traditions". It turns out that the President made reference only to the extraterritorial national communities, municipalities and regional officials, but not to the ethnic groups which have their own republics with their own laws according to their culture. In Golbe´s view, this is a "silence that spoke more loudly" given  the importance of these regions in the formation and structure of the country.

          The emphasys in the peculiarity of the Russian culture is a recurrent narrative in Putin´s speeches, who usually evokes espiritual and civilizational issues when he addresses this theme. It clear in his speech of the July 20th that the Russian culture is the link that unites the multiethnic nation, a prevailing culture.

(São Paulo, the largest city of Brazil and the Americas, with 11 million inhabitants, the scene of Svetlana Ruseishvili´s research: the researcher considered as Russians the people in the city based on the linguistic unity.)

          This Putin´s view can be better understood by distinguishing the role of each national group within Russia, historically constructed as a multinational empire. In her PhD thesis in Sociology at the University of São Paulo Ser russo em São Paulo ("To be Russian in São Paulo"), Russian-born Svetlana Ruseishvili, based in Brazil, seeks to answer the question: "What is to be Russian?" to mark her field approach. Ruseishvili reminds us that Russia must be understood according to the imperialistic nature of it´s state, where the ethnical and civic dimensios of being Russian aren´t totally separeted (all ethnic Russians are Russian citizens, as well as all non-ethnic Russian who lives within the country´s border).

          Ruseishvili explains that as the Empire expanded from the 16th century onwards, various ethnic groups were incorporated into it´s domain, creating different citizens categories according to their ethnic identity. The assimilation obeyed geographical and cultural criteria, and the people "with little degree of citizenship" received a inferior administritve and political status. The author says:        

"The concern of an Empire in organizing it´s conquered territories in a segregated way, giving to some greater cultural and political weight than to others, created a conception of ethnical belonging as an inherent attribute of each individual, being imutable and inherited." (p. 179)

          The sociologist uses the idea of common language to explain the so-called "Russian world". Understanding the Russian world through the ideia of common language, the term acquires a conception that is similar to that of the Russian Academy, conceptualized as:

"...a transnational cultural space whose main element is the Russian language. With no doubt, the ideological dimension of this concept cannot be ignored: the Russian world is first and foremost a world of Russian colonization, with it´s history of 'russificiation' of the new territories as the main strategy of cultural assimilation." (p. 182)

          And she continues:

"However, the result of these policies has become a conception of ethnic nationality based primarily on linguistic belonging. In this way, the Russian language, a language difficult for non-native speakers, has become the univeral common denominator for a multilingual and multinational country like Russia. Paraphrasing Elias, the Russian language effectively changed in an institution that allows to speak of the existence of a national habitus in Russia" (p. 182) 

          Before this part, Ruseishvili reproduces passages written by the German sociologist Norbert Elias, for whom the national counscience, the personality of a people, "cristallize in institutions that have the responsability of ensuring" that several different people acquire the same national habitus. For him, the common language is the "most immediate" example of this habitus. 

          It was on the basis on the common usage of the anguage which the Russian sociologist defined who the Russians and their descendents are in São Paulo. The language "is the central element of understanding of what I have called here 'to be Russian'". This is the delimiting factor of this social group´s bounderies capable of giving it internal cohesion and that allows people of different ethnicities to present themselves as Russians without exposing their original identity. In this way, Ruseishvili delimited her field research where, in addition to ethnic Russians, she approached Jews, Ukrainians, Bessarabians and Lithuanians all as Russians.

  

          For Russians, therefore, the Russian language is the national habitus and element of the culture that manifest itsefl more directly in national institutions. In this case, the school would be the main vehicle and disseminator of the language. Goble doesn´t speak about the school in Putin´s speech, but this can be implied given it´s role as propagator of the civic and national values. For the Portuguese historian Fernando Catroga, in the book "Between God and Ceasers", the school is responsible for instilling civic values in people:

"In appealing to the needing of education to provide a common moral and social education, it demanded the sharing of common values and ideas about the world and life (...), worldliness that the action of the political power (...) would have to become hegemonic in order to 'create' rationalistic and patriotic citizens. What, as we saw, didn´t exempt the socializing role, if not from a civil religion (...), at least some kind of 'secular' or 'civic religion'" (p. 302-303)

(View of the Kremlin: in Russia the state has strong presence within society, including as promoter of the Russian culture throughout the centuries, like the mother tongue.)

               The Catroga´s quotation occurs within his analysis of the Church-State relationship in an historical perspective to highlight the school´s role in propagation of values. This is particularly relevant in Russia because of the strong state´s role in social life, where even the church was under it´s direct influence. For centuries the political authority was above the religious authorities with several moments of tension. The church was submissive to political power not only during the Soviet period, as Ruseishvili relates, but throughout all period since the reign of Peter, the Great. According to the British historianl Benedict H. Sumner, in 1721 the emperor abolished the Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church and replaced it by an administrative board, the Holy Synod. The emperor Alexander I went further: in 1824 he appointed a chief prosecutor (in practice a minister of state) to lead the Synod. This situations lasted until the Russian Revolution in 1917. With the restauration of the Patriarchate in 1918, however, came it´s submition to a body directly linked to the CPSU and the massive anti-religious persecution, particularly in 1929 and 1937. Today, even though Church and State are oficially separeted, in practice there´s a relation of dependence and mutual support: the church is tied to the ctate and depends on it for it´s revival and maintenance (the reconstruction of churches and monasteries detroyed during the Soviet period was supported and financed by the Kremlin and the new oligarchs); on the other hand the state seeks support and legitimacy in the church as way of uniting the country and exalting nation sentiment.

               From this we can conclude that the Russian state isn´t only an administrator of the public affairs, but above all a structure which seeks to embrace the whole of society and, therefore, to define the role and values that it must bear. Looking at the country´s history described by Sumner, as the Russian state expands, it also expands it´s activities within various domains of public life, particularly since the Peter the Great administration. In Russia, State and society walk thogether or, to be more exact, the State walks above the society and even the Church.   

          When Golbe says that Putin didn´t make reference to non-Russian republics, but only the nations without their own territory, it´s implied that the priority of the Russian language over all others goes beyond the school and embrace the entire state apparatus. This doesn´t means that these groups don´t have their own state apparatus capable of propagating the mother tongue, but rather that these languages are of secundary importance to the national project of promotion of the Russia´s mother tongue.             

          I don´t intend here to qualify what Putin said, but to conclude this brief analysis by stating that for what we call Russia, the Russian ethnicity doens´t prevail over the others only in number (equivalent to 82% of the country´s population), but also formally through official promotion of their mother tongue. In this way, the state acts to promote national and territorial unity through a specific culture, but without necessarily depreciate other cultures, since there´s no legally prohibition of teaching the language of the non-Russian ethnicity.

(Map of the ethnic group of the former USSR: the mother tongue generally goes along to the corresponding ethnic groups. The Russian language - whose ethnic group appears in red - is the most widespread in the region, and goes beyond the ethnic and national borders of present-day Russia.)

          Meanwhile the evocation of the "Russian world" along with ethnic and linguistic contours as a vector of the Moscow´s foreign policy is a concern for neighbours like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, which have military presence of Russia, as well as for other countries of the former USSR, which witness the "multiplication" of Russian citizens by granting citizenship to it´s inhabitants. In this way the Russian world enlarges legally and Moscow starts to claim the right over these populations. But this already is another problem.

* Published in Portuguese on July 24th, 2017.

The publication of the debate between Carvalho and Dugin in Romania: the need to defend a nation

(Cover of the Romanian publication.)

For the first time the debate between Olavo de Carvalho and Alexander Dugin will be published in another language than Portuguese and English. It´s an initiative of the publishing company Humanitas, from Romania. The publication is, therefore, in Romanian language, and will be released on November 20th this year.

(Horia-Roman Patapievici)

In an interview given to a television channel of his country, the philosopher, essayist and former chairman of the Romanian Cultural Institute, Horia-Roman Patapievici, spoke about the book´s publication (here and here for those who know Romanian). Patapievici was asked why publishing in Romania a book with Dugin´s ideias because of the hostility inspired by his philosophical thought and the Eurasian Movement. In the text below, reproduced in Portuguese in Olavo de Carvalho´s profile on Facebook, there are the Romanian thinker´s answers:

"Interviwer: Why publishing company Humanitas publishes Alexander Dugin?

Horia-Roman Patapievici: Because we have to know our adversaries well, and Dugin is author of a well-articulated theory, that recovers the totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century, but also the Russian messianism idea, to proporse an Eurasianism theory.  The Western Liberalism is, for him, absolute evil. The hate - de-legitimized by liberal political practice - against modernity a postmodernity must lead, after all, to the annihilation of the West and it´s values system.

Interviwer: Then, is it not harmful the spread of his ideas in the Romanian space? 

Horia-Roman Patapievici: No, because the retort of the Brazilian professor Olavo de Carvalho is a brilliant retort. Olavo de Carvalho is the complete opposite of the institutionalized intellectual idea, as is the Dugin´s case. He has exiled himself from his native Brazil to a farm in the US, where he has an online philosophical "garden" with 3000 students. He opposes to the Dugin´s emotional rethoric the argumentation delivered from Western-type rationality. Therefore, Humanitas publishes this book, firstly, to know an extremly pernicious ideology, against the values we believe in and even against our statehood, but also to have access to a counter-argument, a brilliant retort, that mobilizes the best in the Western society, to show that Dugin´s ideology has no root in the Western philosophy, thought, culture and religion.

Interviwer: Why is Putinism dangerous to the Romanian stability?

Horia-Roman Patapievici: Because the Eurasian plan relies on the Asia´s division between Russia and China, turning Europe to be entirely of Russia. In this plan, Romania has no future. It has to be part of Russia. It´s unnaceptable, not only from the Romanian point of view, as also European.

Without going into debate´s merit, two points at the Patavievici´s responses deserve attention. The first is the cultural war waged by Dugin against values that politically and socially support the West. His war isn´t restricted to the field of ideas: it enters into politics. In his complex trajectory as philospher, ideologist, founder of cultural movements and advisor to political leaders, the Russian thinker has already openly stated that his intention isn´t act as a politician, but to acto behind the scenes to influence it. When creating the political movement Evraziia, on April 21st 2001, Dugin stated: "Our goal is not to achieve the power, nor to fight for power, but to fight for influence on it." According to professor Marlène Laruelle, the movement was intended to formulate a "national idea" for Russia. Dugin leaved Evraziia in September 2003, just over a year after it´s transformation into political party and two months after it´s merger with the Rodina Bloc, whose ideological profile he desagreed with. But he continued his trajectory as adviser to other Russian MPs and professor at Moscow State University (where he left in 2014), releasing a series of books and texts on the internet, as on Forth Political Thoery and the newly founded Katehon.

(The mastodontic Palace of the Parliament - 365.000 m² - build by dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu, in Bucharest: communist experice helped put Romania into the EU and NATO.)

The second point is the geopolitical dimension of the Neo-Eurasian thought. In June I´ve made a brief analysis on the Dugin´s vision on Brexit based in an interview with the think thank Katehon (of which he´s member of the Supervisory Board) under the title "Brexit: Europe is falling into abyss" and in the debate with Olavo de Carvalho. The Russian thinker states that the European decline would be due the "ultraliberal ideology" in the continent, and puts in check the Western leadership in the world. On the other hand he shows preference for the rival alternative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose two main members are Russia and China. "Brexit is the collapse of the West and it is a victory for humanity", Dugin says, which after completes: "And the flagship of the mankind is the SCO, Russia, the current sovereign free multipolar Russia led by Putin, and those who are in the Eurasian Club".

The cultural war and the geopolitical consequences of Neo-Eurasianism are at the core of the Patapievici´s warning. In a world shaped by the Eurasian Movement and led by the SCO will be little or no space for opposition from smaller countries such as Romania. After the experience in the Communist bloc, this helps explain the country´s choice for the European Union and NATO. In addition, Russia and China has a long-term estrategic alliance (like the multibillion-dollar Russian gas supply agreements in 2014), being China the attraction pole of all Eastern Asia and Russia the frontline of the Eurasianism expansion with it´s onslaughts in Europe and even in the US in the political, cultural and military fields. In a world were multinational powers (whether Eurasian or Western) grow excessively, it´s necessary to know where the greatest danger lies to know to situate itself more consciously and less unconfortably among great powers. In the Romania´s case this accomodation is strictly necessary, since the country is situated in Eastern Europe with Moldova and Ukraine, countries under Russia´s direct action.

 (Third and second editions of "The Garden of Afflictions", by the philospher Olavo de Carvalho: defense of inner freedom against the modern state´s intrusion. In the third edition, the philosopher corrects some distortions of his essay and supplements it with a brief analysis of the Dugin´s Neo-Eurasian plan.)

Finally, here is what Patapievici commented on the Brazilian philosopher: "Olavo de Carvalho is the complete opposite of the institucionalized intellectual", whose reply to Dugin he defined as "brilliant". This is keeping with I wrote in the text on Brexit: Dugin doesn´t understand Carvalho´s thought, he can´t see him out of an ideological frame, and for this very reason he feels confused in the debate he had with the Brazilian. For the Russian it was inconceivable that his adversary were an opponent of the Eurasian plan and also the Western globalist plan. It happens that Carvalho think as an individual and not within ideological schemes, however complex they may be. It´s this inner freedom that Patapievici also wants to preserve, because the nation´s freedom depends upon it. This last sentence isn´t a passionate, emotional defense of freedom: it´s the pillar of Olavo de Carvalho´s though, as the final chapter of which I consider the best of his book, The Garden of Afflictions (p. 307, 2nd edition) shows:

In the absence of spiritual power (...) power is the sole judge. Democratic or oligarchic, communist or capitalist, monarchical or republican, social-democrat or neoliberal, it will always be the Caesar´s power, with an incoercible propensity to self-divinize. And as long as we don´t understand these things we´ll continue to bet on this or that political system, not seeing that the merits of any political system depend essentially that it knows to respect the limits imposed by the people´s religious conscience, vivified by the presence of spiritual authority and based on values that precede from long the very birth of this system and the very society it governs; that precede, maybe, from eternity."

* Published in Portuguese on November 18th 2016.