Trump on Ukraine: did he know what really was talking about?

(Then-candidate Trump in an interview to Stephanopoulos, in July 2016.)

In an interview conducted by the journalist of the ABC American network, George Stephanopoulos, then-presidential candidate to the US presidency, Donald Trump, was confronted to answer about his possible personal relationship with Vladimir Putin and how he intended to react to the annexation of Crimea by Russia and to the following crisis. The interview was held in July 2016 and caused much controversy mainly over Trump´s responses on Ukraine.

In the book Who Lost Russia? How the World Entered a New Cold War, by British journalist and internation editor of The Sunday Times, Peter Conradi, there´s one paragraph where the author sums up the Trump´s responses on the issue:

"Doubts about Trump were fulled by a curious television interview in July 2016 in which Trump declared of Putin: 'He´s not going into Ukraine, OK, just so you understand. He´s not going to go into Ukraine, all right?' Asked by ABC´s George Stephanopoulos if the realised Putin as 'there already', Trmup retorted, 'OK - well, he´s there in a certain way.' More significant was Trump´s vow to 'take a look' ate recognising Russia´s seizure of Crimea. 'You know, the people of Crime, from what I´ve heard, would rather be with Russia then where they were,' he said. Trump attempted to clarify his position on the conflict between Ukraine and Russia in a series of tweets the following morning, after he was criticised fo his muddled response, but did not retract his thoughts about Crimea." (p. 316-317)  

Watching the interview in full and paying attention to the passage where he approaches the subject discussed here (between 6:01 and 7:23 in the video), it´s possible to perceive that Trump isn´t clear and is relatively insecure in giving quick responses on Ukraine. After stating clearly that Putin wasn´t penetrating into the neighbouring country and being directly questioned by Stephanopoulos that, yes, he was going into there, Trump answered, unconvincingly, that the Russian president was there "in some way", denoting not knowing the issue or avoiding a verbal confrontation with Putin and his campaign proposals. The Russian presence in Ukraine is widely recognized by the academy in the West, as i´ve already commented in this blog and as shown in recent disclosure of phone calls between a Kremlin advisor and political allies in Ukrinae, as well as Conradi himself.

 (Trump trying to clraify his declarations in the interview. His explanations didn´t convince critics.)



In saying he would "take a look" at the recognition of the annexation of Crimea, Trump was vague on the issue. At the time he´d been confronted by Stephanopoulos, who recalled his position on a possible recongnition of Crimea as part of Russia. "Take a look" and state according to other people that the peninsula´s population would rather be with Russia than Ukraine denotes possible lack of knowledge about the details and the real implications of the problem. The annexation of Crimea involves international law, a challenge to the post-Second War world order and also the public peninsula´s public opinion, mostly inhabitated by ethnic Russians and historically pro-Russia. Althoug Trump recognizes the existence of a pro-Russia public opinion, the equation isn´t simple, given that the referendum hold on March 16th 2014 and that officialized the annexation of the region occured under military occupation, putting in check it´s legitimation and setting a precedent for further such interventions.



(Sergei Lavrov and then-Obama´s Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, at a meeting in Geneva on March 6th 2009 aiming to renew relations between Moscow and Washington. The button should have the word "reset" written on the box in English and Russian. The Russian translation, however, was wrong: it was written "overload" instead of "reset", a harbinger of what was to come.)

Conradi recalls in his book that the Obama´s reset with Russia from March 2009 aiming to improve relations between both countries was a disaster, and that the Washington´s atitude of not directly confronting Russia in international crisis as in Ukraine and Syria encouraged Moscow to move forward with it´s project of restoring the superpower status, mainly in Putin´s third term (2012-2018). Trump was clear and straightforward in criticizing Obama and the "mess" that Ukraine became (term used by him in the interview) during his presidency, even with NATO at his disposal.

Trump was also asked why he softened the Republican Party´s official policy on Ukraine, reffering to the discussion on aid to the country with letal weapons in the war against pro-Russian separatists. The candidate retorted several times that he "wasnt´s involved" in this decision and that only knew this softening. His promisse was to "take a look" in it´s content. The issue came to light recently when one of the Republican National Convention members said Trump was in the event and that would have asked the party not to play the US in a "Third World War" in a dispute over Ukraine. This softening would also be a way for aligning the party with the candidate´s proposal to ease tensions with Russia.



(Peter Conradi´s book: if post-USSR Russia should be treated as a defeated power or a partner on equal footing, the persistence of the Cold War mentality, expansion of NATO, Putin´s paranoia on "Colored Revolutions" and the West´s lack of firmness in front of Moscow´s attacks occured due what the author called "fundamental misunderstandings" from both sides resulting in the current situation. Difficult picture for Donald Trump.) 



This interview helps to explaing criticism and concerns with Trump since he was a possible White House´s dweller at the time, and that the relations with Russia already was (and still are) among the priorities of the US government. His remarks on Ukraine point for two issues: a relative lack of awareness of the crisis in this country and the intention to avoid incisive criticism on Putin in order to avoid tensions with Russia and not get in contradiction with his campaign proposes. Despite uncertainties of what he´d do in the presidency, Trump gave clear signals of commitment to NATO and support to Ukraine with appointment of James Mattis as Defense Secretary, firm supporter of the organization, and the explicit condemnation of the annexation of Crimea at the UN. As for the sanctions on Russia, they were renewed on February 2nd, but it´s future is still debateble given the little relief of the sanctions by the US Tresury and possible strategies that Trump could adopt to ease tensions with Moscow.

The Trump government is just at the beggining and it´s still early to say how it will deal with Russia in the long term and how Ukraine will fit into this equation.

Trump sobre a Ucrânia: ele sabia o que realmente estava dizendo?

(O então candidato Trump na entrevista com Stephanopoulos, em julho de 2016.)

Numa entrevista realizada pelo jornalista da rede americana ABC, George Stephanopoulos, o então candidato à presidência dos EUA, Donald Trump, foi confrontado a responder sobre sua possível relação pessoal com Vladimir Putin e como pretendia reagir à anexação da Crimeia pela Rússia e à crise que se seguiu. A entrevista foi realizada em julho de 2016 e causou muita controvérsia principalmente sobre as respostas de Trump sobre a Ucrânia.

No livro Who Lost Russia? How the World Entered a New Cold War, do jornalista britânico e editor internacional do The Sunday Times, Peter Conradi, há um parágrafo onde o autor resume as repostas de Trump sobre o tema:

"Dúvidas sobre Trump foram alimentadas por uma curiosa entrevista na televisão em julho de 2016 em que Trump declarou sobre Putin: 'Ele não está entrando na Ucrânia, ok, só para você entender. Ele não está entrando na Ucrânia, tudo bem?' Questionado por George Stephanopoulos se ele percebia que Putin 'já estava lá', Trump respondeu, 'Ok - bem, ele está lá de alguma forma.' Mais significativa foi a promessa de Trump de 'dar uma olhada' sobre o reconhecimento da tomada da Crimeia pela Rússia. 'Sabe, o povo da Crimeia, pelo o que eu tenho ouvido, gostaria mais de estar com a Rússia do que onde eles estavam', disse. Trump tentou esclarecer sua posição sobre o conflito entre a Ucrânia e a Rússia numa série de tweets na manhã seguinte, depois que ele foi criticado por sua resposta confusa, mas não voltou atrás na suas ideias sobre a Crimeia." (p. 316-317, tradução livre)

Observando a entrevista na íntegra e prestando atenção no trecho em que ele aborda o tema aqui discutido (entre 6:01 e 7:23 do vídeo), é possível perceber que Trump não é claro e mostra-se relativamente inseguro ao dar respostas rápidas sobre a Ucrânia. Depois de dizer claramente que Putin não estava penetrando no país vizinho e ser questionado diretamente por Stephanopoulos que, sim, ele estava entrando lá, Trump respondeu, de forma pouco convincente, que o presidente russo estava lá "de alguma forma", denotando não saber da questão ou evitar um confronto verbal com Putin e suas propostas de campanha. A presença russa na Ucrânia é amplamente reconhecida pela academia no Ocidente, como já comentei neste blog e como mostra a recente divulgação de telefonemas entre um assessor do Kremlin e aliados políticos na Ucrânia, além do próprio Conradi.

 (Trump tentando esclarecer suas declarações na entrevista: "Quando eu disse numa entrevista que Putin 'não está entrando na Ucrânia, você pode anotar,' eu estou dizendo se eu fosse presidente. [Putin] já está na Crimeia!" Sua explicação não convenceu os críticos.)



Ao dizer que iria "dar uma olhada" sobre o reconhecimento da anexação da Crimeia, Trump foi vago sobre a questão. No momento ele havia sido confrontado por Stephanopoulos, que lembrou sua posição sobre um possível reconhecimento da Crimeia como parte da Rússia. "Dar uma olhada" e afirmar por terceiros que a população da península preferiria estar com a Rússia do que com a Ucrânia denota possível falta de conhecimento sobre os detalhes e as reais implicações do problema. A anexação da Crimeia envolve direito internacional, desafio à ordem mundial pós-Segunda Guerra e também a opinião pública da península, majoritariamente habitada por russos étnicos e historicamente pró-Rússia. Apesar de Trump reconhecer a existência de uma opinião pública pró-Rússia, a equação não é simples, dado que o referendo realizado em 16 de março de 2014 e que oficializou a anexação da região ocorreu sob ocupação militar, colocando em cheque a legitimidade do referendo e abrindo um precedente para novas intervenções do tipo.



(Sergei Lavrov e a então Secretária de Estado de Obama, Hillary Clinton, num encontro em Genebra em 6 de março de 2009 com o objetivo de renovar as relações entre Moscou e Washington. O botão deveria ter a palavra "reset" escrita na caixa em inglês e russo. A tradução russa, porém, estava errada: escreveram "sobrecarga" no lugar de "reset", um prenúncio do que estava por vir.)

Conradi lembra no seu livro que o reset do governo Obama com a Rússia a partir de março de 2009 com o objetivo de melhorar as relações entre os dois países foi um desastre, e que a atitude de Washington de não confrontar diretamente a Rússia em crises internacionais como na Ucrânia e na Síria encorajou Moscou a seguir adiante com o projeto de restauração de seu status de superpotência, principalmente a partir do terceiro mandado de Putin (2012-2018). Trump foi claro e direto nas crítica à Obama e na "bagunça" em que se tornou a Ucrânia (termo usado por ele na entrevista) durante sua presidência, mesmo tendo a OTAN à sua disposição.

Trump também foi questionado por quê ele abrandou a política oficial do Partido Republicano sobre a Ucrânia, referindo-se à discussão sobre ajuda ao país com armas letais na guerra contra os separatistas pró-Rússia. O candidato respondendo diversas vezes que "não estava envolvido" nesta decisão e que apenas sabia deste abrandamento. Sua promessa era de "dar uma olhada" no seu conteúdo. A questão voltou à tona recentemente quando um dos membros da Convenção Nacional Republicana afirmou que Trump estava no evento e que teria pedido para que o partido não jogasse os EUA numa "Terceira Guerra Mundial" numa disputa pela Ucrânia. Este abrandamento também seria uma forma de alinhar o partido com a proposta do candidato de diminuir as tensões com a Rússia.



(O livro de Peter Conradi: a dúvida se a Rússia pós-URSS deveria ser tratada como uma potência vencida ou um parceiro em pé de igualdade, a persistência da mentalidade da Guerra Fria, a expansão da OTAN, a paranoia de Putin sobre as "Revolução Coloridas" e a falta de pulso do Ocidente frente às investidas de Moscou ocorreram devido ao que o autor chamou de "incompreensões fundamentais" de ambos os lados, resultando na situação atual.

Quadro difícil para Donald Trump.)



Esta entrevista ajuda a explicar as críticas e preocupações com Trump já que, na época, ele era o possível ocupante da Casa Branca, e que as relações com a Rússia estavam (e ainda estão) entre as prioridades do governo americano. Suas respostas sobre a Ucrânia apontam para duas questões: um relativo desconhecimento da crise neste país e a intenção de evitar críticas incisivas a Putin com o objetivo de evitar tensões com a Rússia e não entrar em contradição com suas propostas de campanha. Apesar das incertezas sobre o que faria na presidência, Trump deu claros sinais de compromisso com a OTAN e de apoio à Ucrânia com a nomeação de James Mattis como secretário de defesa, firme apoiador da organização, e a explícita condenação da anexação da Crimeia na ONU. Quanto às sanções à Rússia, estas foram renovadas em 2 de fevereiro, mas seu futuro ainda é discutível dado o pequeno alívio às sanções pelo Tesouro americano e às possíveis estratégias que Trump poderá adotar para aliviar as tensões com Moscou.

O governo Trump está recém no início e ainda é cedo para afirmar como lidará com a Rússia no longo prazo e como a Ucrânia se encaixará nesta equação.

The Russian new world order and it´s bedfellows

                           (Marine Le Pen, leader of National Front of France, and Vladimir Putin.)

In the short article Russia´s Bedfellowing Policy and the European Far Right, published in the
Russian Analytical Digest (nº 167 on May 6th 2015), professor of International Relations of Georgetown University Marlène Laruelle analyzes the general strategy of the Russian government in the enticement of "partners" within Europe.

In the second term of Vladimir Putin (2004-2008) the Russian government, taking advantage of the economic boom that the country lived with the high gains in gas and oil trade, invested heavily in promoting it´s globalization. Much of the legacy of the vast Soviet-era contact networks that existed around the world, such as the Communist parties, has retreated with the end of the regime and the following economic crisis of the 1990´s. With the return of economic prosperity, the government began to invest in TV channels, radio, internation groups of academic discussions and promoting foundations of "Russian values" aiming to form an alternative world order to the West having Russia as reference.

Today the country seeks new partners abroad, mainly in Europe, to extend the arms of it´s new order. As Laruelle says:

"This ‘bedfellowing’ policy has been built on an ideological agenda that has taken some time to develop. It can be briefly defined as follows: Russia denounces the hypocrisy and double standards of the Western world order, which pretends that Western countries, and especially the United States, promote an idealist agenda of democracy promotion, human rights, and the right to interfere on humanitarian grounds. However, Washington’s foreign policy, Russia insists, is in fact shaped by purely realistic, strategic interests: it aims to preserve the supremacy of its military, financial and industrial capabilities, to maintain its allies—Europe, Japan, Israel—in a situation of security dependence, and to ensure that no competition emerges from other countries or regional blocks."

(BRICS´ meeting in Fortaleza, Brazil, in July 2014.)

Russia, Laruelle continues, says the current world order seeks to favor the US legally and financially, as well as guaranteeing for the Americans the information domain through the hosting of internet servers. "In turn", the professor says "Russia seeks to denounce this form of realpolitik, and to establish alternatives to American global dominance, such as the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, assertive positions at the UN, confronting NATO, supporting opposite regimes to the West (such as Syria and North Korea) and policies that challenge US supremacy in the aerospace and information industry. This, of course, serves Russia´s own strategical goals, as for example it´s pursuit for a strategical partnership with China.

(Members, observers and partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.)

The creation, for example, of the Russian medias, such as Russia Today and Sputnik, put here in this blog, are explicit examples of this endeavor. In the same way, the sponsorship of the Russian oligarch´s great fortunes close to the government for events such as the World Congress of Families shows that an intricate web of relations among politicians, multibillionaires, intellectuals and political, academic and social organization are creating a Kremlin-centered network and promoting an indeological agenda at the international level. This whole structure aims, in the last instance, to contain and replace, according to the Eurasian language, the "unipolarity" of the US global power by the "multipolarity" led by Russia.

(Russia Today - RT - television channel. The suggestive news headline refers to the Bilderberg Group, consisting of billionaires and Western political leaders.)

It´s interesting to note that the aliance that the Moscow government seeks with the far-right and fascists in Europe, as well as with the far-left, is based on a critical stance that both Russian leaders and such European groups have about the US role in the world, the current organization of the European Union, the Western democracy and liberalism in moral values (with the exception of the far-left in this last point). The far-right, however, isn´t a pro-Russian monolithic bloc, being some of them anti-Russian, especially the nationalist groups of countries that have already been under the Moscow´s rule in the Soviet times, such as those in Eastern Europe and Ukraine. By this way, Russia has an alliance with extremist groups who are out of the mainstream of European politics and seeks through contacts, meetings and discussion groups to bring them to the center of the political landscape in order to make them palatable to Western democracies. At the same time, while the Russian government has been striving to promote fascist groups in Europe on one hand, on other it has fought groups of the same ideology in Ukraine. As Laruelle says:

"The Kremlin is thus performing a difficult balancing act. It denounces the role of ultra-nationalism in the Euro-Maidan revolution and the influence of neofascist groups in Ukraine, while parties with a similar, but pro-Russia, ideology are held up as the authentic representatives of European conservative values." 

We can conclude from author´s comment that, if for the US is valid the two weights, two measures principle when applying it´s policy of strategic interests, exactly the same is true for Russia in it´s strategy of influencing European politics and, in a wider dimension, global policy. Although the Russian game has Europe as it´s main arena, it´s pretension isn´t merely regional. Eurasia is it´s stepping stone to the world.

* Published in Portuguese on July 2nd 2015.

Ukraine: a planned crisis?

(Eurasian Youth Union´s rally.)

Wars, conflicts, mass demonstratios, all this occurs always with some planning behind or at least with some sort of stimulus or "push" that triggers the desired effects.

In August 2014, already during the ongoing war in Ukraine, professor Anton Shekhovtsov published in his blog comparative photos of Eurasian Youth Union´s members between the years 2006 and 2014. The photos taken in 2006 show five members of this movement at a summer camp for indoctrination and training of ultra-nationalist cadres. According to Shekhovtsov, these members should actively fight against democratic movements, a reference to the so-called "Colored Revolutions" that took place in countries neighboring to Russia in 2004 and 2005. The 2014 photos show, one by one, the members of the Union occupying key posts in the administration of the self-proclamed "Donetsk People´s Republic", a region dominated by the pro-Russian fighters that claims for autonomy in eastern Ukraine. Bellow are two of the examples identified by Shekhovtsov.

               

(Andrei Purgin, leader of the Donetsk Republic organization at the camp in 2006, and as Prime Minister of the "Donetsk People´s Republic" in 2014.)

            

(Oksana Shkoda, at the Union´s camp in 2006, and as representative of the "Donetsk People´s Republic´s" headquarter in 2014.)

The Union was founded in 2005 by the Russian ideologist Alexander Dugin and then deputy head of the presidencial administration Vladimir Surkov. The Eurasian Youth Union Party Program outlines guidelines to be followed by it´s members. Firstly, it points to the US as the great enemy to sorround and penetrate Russia with the spread of it´s financial, plutocratic tiranny and moral degeneration. Then, the program proclaims the so-called "Great Cleansing", an era of fighting to nation´s alleged traitors that hold key positions in media, bureaucracy, and to fight againts conformism for the construction of Greater Russia. In order to carry out this revolution, the program establishes the creation of an Eurasian Army and seeks to boost the Eurasian pride by highlighting the supposed virtues of the Eurasia´s people, and promise to honor the values inherited by their ancestors. Finally, it promises to fulfill it´s destiny, to realize the Eurasian Revolution and to establish the Eurasian Empire, whose members would live the highest virtues of honor and glory, claims for the creation of a country with a "joyous" and "merciless" people and invite the young to get thogether in the "Eurasian collective", which is the Youth Union. All the party program is based on Dugin´s thought, which references are clear in it´s language, the enemies to be fought (US and the Western financial elites) and in the promise to rescue and protect the Eurasia´s peoples cultures.

(Vladimir Surkov with Vladimir Putin in 2006)

Those who follow this blog probably have an general idea of who Alexander Dugin is, but maybe don´t know Vladimir Surkov. Surkov was Russian deputy prime minister and assistant to the Russian president in international affairs, and it´s considered one of the architects of Russia today. He defines himself as "one of the actors of the Russian system", is nicknamed "political technologist of all Rus [Russia]" and presents himself as firm West´s opponent. As deputy head of the administration, Surkov met with Russian journalists and determined what should and should not be said and appear in country´s televisions, as well as encouraged the media to present the Kremlin as a stable and reliable power. Among other activities, he published literary works exposing the double character of Russian public moral, characteristic heritage of the Soviet period and of which Surkov is a representative.

(Konstantin Malofeev)

Another member who would be also involved in Ukraine crisis is the oligarch Konstantin Malofeev. He´s accused by Western leaders of financing the pro-Russian fighters in the neighboring country, and is on the list of economic sanctions of Canada and European Union, which he considers "much stupid" and unable to affect his business. Maloffev is head of the investments firm Marshall Capital and is described in the Western media as "Putin´s Soros", in allusion to his financial support for Kremlin projects, and as "God´s oligarch", a reference to his commitment to promoting Orthodox Christian values and the restauration of glory of the former Russian Empire. Among his actions are the funding to the World Congress of Families, to the dissemination of traditional values (i.e. Orthodox) through his St. Basil the Great Foundation, the law against homossexual propaganda to minors in Russia, the internet control and the rebels in Ukraine.

(Strelkov, Malofeev and Dugin in a meeting recorded in vídeo in na unidentified location.)

The conection between Malofeev an the Kremlin circle is narrow. On his list of contacts are the former Russian Minister of Communications Igor Shchyogolev, the head of state Russian Railways Vladimir Yakunin, the likely Vladimir Putin´s personal confessor and head of one of the main monasteries in Russia father Tikhon, the political technologist, former Malofeev´s public consultor and former Prime Minister of the self-proclaimed "Donetsk People´s Republic" Alexander Borodai, the member of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia and leader of the pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine Igor Girkin (known as Igor Strelkov) and Alexander Dugin.

Marshall Capital provides funding to the St. Basil Foundation. In this company, Igor Strelkov would have worked years ago, information denied by the oligarch. Strelkov also appears in the economic sanctions imposed by the US and European Union.

Malofeev, Strelkov and Borodai probably form a close relationship. In a trip to Ukraine that would have aimed the exposure of Orthodox relics, Malofeev visited Kiev and had his protection provided by Strelkov, who is also a Borodai´s friend.

(Igor Girkin - or Strelkov - military leader of the pro-Russian fighters in Ukraine.)

The oligarch doesn´t spare praise to Strelkov, whom calls "a man of ideals". He also says that for his actions in Ukraine Strelkov would be a "real hero". "He´s got the spirit of a Russian officer. As someone loves the Russian Empire, I can only sympathize with him." Dugin also shed many praises and exalt Strelkov´s figure, whom he describes as "the Russian myth" presenting him as model of the "ideal" Russian man, the one who embodies the nation´s identity. He would be the "bearer of the Russian archetype". "He´s us", says Dugin, the right man to fight with hatred the spiritual enemy, a reference to the men who embody the Western way of life. Both Malofeev´s and Dugin´s statements suggest that both have a good knowledge of who Strelkov is, and who is openly supported by them.

The relationships network that brings Dugin, Malofeev, Strelkov and Surkov to the conflict in Ukraine is complex. Their role indicates that the Russian government delegates to members of it´s relationship circle the responsability to act in Ukraine, avoiding the accusation that Moscow would be acting directly in it´s territory. This is the stratagem used by Putin to repeatedly state that Russia isn´t intervening in the neighbouring country, what amounts to say that a gang didn´t invade a house because it delegated to the other gang the assault in an agreement signed by both parts.

Given the size of the Russian network linked to the Kremlin that´s operating in Ukraine, it´s higly unlikely it have been created in the period between the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovich, on February 22nd 2014, and the beginning of the Crimean invasion by Russian military forces from the port city of Sevastopol four days later. It not only existed before, like the Eurasian Youth Union´s summer camp, as people like Strelkov were already active in military, an activity without which would be impossible to lead an armed militia. Most important of all, however, it´s the Neo-Eurasian ideology that moves groups such as the Union, the International Eurasian Movement and a number of representatives of politics, the Armed Forces and the media. The ideals of restauration of the former Russian emperial power, as openly supported by the various Konstantin Malofeev´s projects, are perfect tools for the expanstionist program of the Eurasian movement. The oligarch sees the conflict in Ukraine as a war in a cultural context. Culture is seen by the Dugin´s Neo-Eurasian movement as one of the fundations for the formation of civilizations and, hence, of their political forces. For Malofeev there are no differences between Russians and Ukrainians. Both don´t form distinct people, but only one, an idea also shared by the Eurasianists.

It should be noted that the Ukraine´s people and territory are crucial for the creation of Greater Russia and the Eurasian Empire idealized by Dugin, the fighters in Ukraine, the Kremlin´s oligarchs and put into practice by Putin. Judging by the Eurasian Movement´s principles, Moscow won´t rest until its has carried out it´s plans in Ukraine and, thence, to the rest of the world. The fight is much deeper than the economic sanctions imposed by the West to some members of the Russian power. It pass through the conquest of hearts and minds and the bodies movement into the battlefield.

* Published in Portuguese on July 15th 2015.

Martyrs, heroes and others not so saints: the construction of the new Russian identity

(Town of Kaluga, Russia)

The anthropologist and professor at the New Bulgarian University, Milena Benovska-Sabkova, has carried out a work on memory policy implemented in Russia in the religious revival context. Her activity had as reference the city of Kaluga, with 350 thousand inhabitans 150 km southwest Moscow, and has been published in various academical journals (here - page 95-98, here and, most complete, here).

With the end of the Soviet Union, a series of research began in order to reconstitut and rebuild the religious communities, churches and monasteries destroyed in Russia. Much of this work was done by so-called kraevedenie, researchers specializing in local history as cultural heritage, biographies and origins of families. Such a kind of researcher has emerged still in the time of the Soviet Union and actually has a semi-official status, acting independently and also with research centers, schools, churches and local authorities. Within this branche there are the church kraevedenie, who makes the same work, but focused especifically on religious matters, with emphasis on survey of demolished churches, research on religious files and biographical survey of clerics and religious people, especially those who desappeared in the Communist era.

Since 2000, with the Vladimir Putin´s arrival to Presidency of Russia, the activity of the kraevedenie has has gained great official stimulus: they were co-optated by the authorities to work in rescue research of Russian history acting in schools, museums and in local activties such as congresses and books launches. Thus, these reasearchers began to form a semiprofissional group related a) to the national project of memory policy, b) to the regional projects linked to the memory policy at national level, and c) to the spontaneous research acitvity carried out by their members. The church kraevedenie also entered this process, and began to work close to the Russian Orthodox Church´s authorities. Thus, they consolidated the role as intermediaries between the Orthodox clergy and the common citizen making a knowledge "bridge" between the two social groups.

(Optina Pustyn Monastery, in the town of Koselsk 60 km from Kaluga. Founded in the 15th century, the monastery is one of the main ones in Russia and also region´s religious center. It was transformed by the Bolsheviks in the Kraevedenie Museum in 1917-29, and later received a department of a Koselk´s museum in 1957.)

It´s through the close relationship between the kraevedenie and the Russian Orthodox Church that the religious revival takes place in Russia. They work together both at national level in the Synodal Commission of Canonization of Saints and at regional level, following the example of the Commission of Canonization of the Eparchy of Kaluga, where the anthropologist Milena carried out her research. Therefore, these researchers not only rescue the Orthodoxy´s past memory but also integrate the Church´s plan to reconstitute a national religious identity.

Since 1989, the Orthodox Church has carried out a series of canonizations, among them the confessors and "new martyrs", that is, the religious assassinated or dead during the communist regime. The church kraevedenie are of fundament importance mainly for rescuing files, survivors´ memories and to discover abandoned cemiteries in the old churches. Along them work the so-called "religious entrepreneurs" who commit some of their time and personal resources to carry out and organize religious processions, restore icons, restore and rebuild destroyed churchers and create the so-called "sacred places" for visitation, as the new memorial designed in Kaluga for the veneration of the new martyrs.

The memory policy in Russia also seeks to rehabilitate the civilians and militaries´ memory, especially soldiers killed in World War II. The so-called "Great Patriotic War" is considered, as Angelo Segrillo in the book "Os Russos" ("The Russians") comments, a moment of great trauma, meaning practically a refoundation of the country. It´s estimated that seven thousand cities have been destroyed and up to 27 million people have died in this event, of which 100 thousand only in the small district of Kaluga.

The kraevedenie are also involved in this secular historical rescue, mainly in the discovery and cataloging of the collective graves, activity that involves mainly military groups and war veterans. Milena comments that it´s through the indentification of the dead and a new decent funeral that there´s a "sacralization" of the soldiers, seen as heroes, civil "martyrs" of Russia. "The anonymous dead", the anthropologist says, "are transformed into heroes via personalization and 'proper burial'" (p. 20)

The new martyrs canonization and mainly the national heroes identification serve as a way of dealing with the traumatic past, not only of war but also of anti-religious persecution. Some of the kraevedenie who formed their academical life during the Soviet Union today have to deal with KGB´s files, where many of the crimes commited against religious people as murders, arrests and persecution are documented. The seemingly irreconcilable legacy of Communist terror against religious and ornidary citizens is transformed in a "positive" past through the heroes veneration and the martyrs canonization.

(Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, in Moscow, Russian Orthodox Church´s headquartes. It was destroyed by the Bolsheviks at the behest of Stalin´s, in 1931, and rebuild from 1990 during Yeltsin government. It was consacreated on August 19th 2000.) 

 

In the current Vladimir Putin administration (2013-2018), there´s a clear attempt by the Kremlin to approach and ideologically instrumentalize the discourses of the Orthodox Church´s upper clergy on the country´s history. This instrumentalization, that appears on Putin´s public statements, fosters the idea of Russia as a civilization distinct from the others, unique and origial, in opposition to the West. It would be through the return to it´s cultural roots and the rescue of the tradition that Russia could fulfill it´s role as power which is destined to be. Thus, all Russian history, including the Communist period, is considered "sacred" and necessary as part of an unique experience of a people distinct from the others. In Putin´s own words:

"Many people argue about the Lenin’s Tomb, saying that it does not follow tradition. What does not follow tradition? Just visit Kiev’s Pechersk Lavra or go to Pskov Monastery, or Mount Athos. You will see hallows of holy people there. Go ahead, you can see it all there. Therefore, the communists continued the tradition even in that respect and did it competently, in accordance with the demands of those times."

(Military parade in Moscow on Victory Day, celebrated on May 9th: Communist period rehabilitated as part of the Russia´s "sacred" history.)

It´s possible to see clearly in the Putin´s statement the memory policy carried out in his administration. This is why the official stimulus of a historical rescue and a value transformation of the Communist period, from where the Russia´s new martyrs and heroes were rescued. This policy covers part of the Russian Orthodox Church´s upper clergy, as well as Orthodox leaders and faithful called "fundamentalists" and nationalist groups. These last two nourish an extreme rejection to all the Western influences and demand canonization of proeminent civilian figures in the Russian history, includind the dictator Josef Stalin. The researcher Igor Torbakov of the Uppsala University, in Sweden, comments on this Russian government´s attemp of synthesizing the contradictions of the Russian history into a single narrative:

"In Frederick Corney’s words, 'Putin was offering a narrative of modern Russian history in which the turbulences of Russia’s past served merely as a backdrop to recent progress, an offer of reconciliation without truth.' [author´s highlight] As its support base consists of a broad coalition comprising heterogeneous social groups, the regime, in its quest for historical legitimacy, seeks to synthesize disparate elements of Russia’s different 'pasts' into a kind of eclectic fusion. 'It attempts to yoke, if uncomfortably, various idealized aspects of the tsarist, soviet and émigré pasts' and present this concoction as 'history without guilt or pain.'

The search for an indivisible truth, the fascination with the irrational, the hope to find a special path, a destiny, a mission granted by God and/or History are current discourses among Russian intellectuals in the post-Soviet era, amalgamating all events and ideological branches into a single body. Nothing more exemplary of this characteristics than Alexander Dugin´s Neo-Eurasian though, so often mentioned in this blog, or the extremely heterogenous composition of members and groups linked to the Putin´s United Russia Party.

Russia seeks for an absolute unity, a totality that unifies everything and everyone in a new national identity. The Moscow´s memory policy is one aspect of the attempt to rescue or create a new Russian identity unifying successes and traumas, heroes and martyrs, crimes and holiness acts and "saints" of all specters of  Russian society, even if they arent´s so saint thus.

* Published in Portugues on April 13th 2016.

The publication of the debate between Carvalho and Dugin in Romania: the need to defend a nation

(Cover of the Romanian publication.)

For the first time the debate between Olavo de Carvalho and Alexander Dugin will be published in another language than Portuguese and English. It´s an initiative of the publishing company Humanitas, from Romania. The publication is, therefore, in Romanian language, and will be released on November 20th this year.

(Horia-Roman Patapievici)

In an interview given to a television channel of his country, the philosopher, essayist and former chairman of the Romanian Cultural Institute, Horia-Roman Patapievici, spoke about the book´s publication (here and here for those who know Romanian). Patapievici was asked why publishing in Romania a book with Dugin´s ideias because of the hostility inspired by his philosophical thought and the Eurasian Movement. In the text below, reproduced in Portuguese in Olavo de Carvalho´s profile on Facebook, there are the Romanian thinker´s answers:

"Interviwer: Why publishing company Humanitas publishes Alexander Dugin?

Horia-Roman Patapievici: Because we have to know our adversaries well, and Dugin is author of a well-articulated theory, that recovers the totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century, but also the Russian messianism idea, to proporse an Eurasianism theory.  The Western Liberalism is, for him, absolute evil. The hate - de-legitimized by liberal political practice - against modernity a postmodernity must lead, after all, to the annihilation of the West and it´s values system.

Interviwer: Then, is it not harmful the spread of his ideas in the Romanian space? 

Horia-Roman Patapievici: No, because the retort of the Brazilian professor Olavo de Carvalho is a brilliant retort. Olavo de Carvalho is the complete opposite of the institutionalized intellectual idea, as is the Dugin´s case. He has exiled himself from his native Brazil to a farm in the US, where he has an online philosophical "garden" with 3000 students. He opposes to the Dugin´s emotional rethoric the argumentation delivered from Western-type rationality. Therefore, Humanitas publishes this book, firstly, to know an extremly pernicious ideology, against the values we believe in and even against our statehood, but also to have access to a counter-argument, a brilliant retort, that mobilizes the best in the Western society, to show that Dugin´s ideology has no root in the Western philosophy, thought, culture and religion.

Interviwer: Why is Putinism dangerous to the Romanian stability?

Horia-Roman Patapievici: Because the Eurasian plan relies on the Asia´s division between Russia and China, turning Europe to be entirely of Russia. In this plan, Romania has no future. It has to be part of Russia. It´s unnaceptable, not only from the Romanian point of view, as also European.

Without going into debate´s merit, two points at the Patavievici´s responses deserve attention. The first is the cultural war waged by Dugin against values that politically and socially support the West. His war isn´t restricted to the field of ideas: it enters into politics. In his complex trajectory as philospher, ideologist, founder of cultural movements and advisor to political leaders, the Russian thinker has already openly stated that his intention isn´t act as a politician, but to acto behind the scenes to influence it. When creating the political movement Evraziia, on April 21st 2001, Dugin stated: "Our goal is not to achieve the power, nor to fight for power, but to fight for influence on it." According to professor Marlène Laruelle, the movement was intended to formulate a "national idea" for Russia. Dugin leaved Evraziia in September 2003, just over a year after it´s transformation into political party and two months after it´s merger with the Rodina Bloc, whose ideological profile he desagreed with. But he continued his trajectory as adviser to other Russian MPs and professor at Moscow State University (where he left in 2014), releasing a series of books and texts on the internet, as on Forth Political Thoery and the newly founded Katehon.

(The mastodontic Palace of the Parliament - 365.000 m² - build by dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu, in Bucharest: communist experice helped put Romania into the EU and NATO.)

The second point is the geopolitical dimension of the Neo-Eurasian thought. In June I´ve made a brief analysis on the Dugin´s vision on Brexit based in an interview with the think thank Katehon (of which he´s member of the Supervisory Board) under the title "Brexit: Europe is falling into abyss" and in the debate with Olavo de Carvalho. The Russian thinker states that the European decline would be due the "ultraliberal ideology" in the continent, and puts in check the Western leadership in the world. On the other hand he shows preference for the rival alternative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose two main members are Russia and China. "Brexit is the collapse of the West and it is a victory for humanity", Dugin says, which after completes: "And the flagship of the mankind is the SCO, Russia, the current sovereign free multipolar Russia led by Putin, and those who are in the Eurasian Club".

The cultural war and the geopolitical consequences of Neo-Eurasianism are at the core of the Patapievici´s warning. In a world shaped by the Eurasian Movement and led by the SCO will be little or no space for opposition from smaller countries such as Romania. After the experience in the Communist bloc, this helps explain the country´s choice for the European Union and NATO. In addition, Russia and China has a long-term estrategic alliance (like the multibillion-dollar Russian gas supply agreements in 2014), being China the attraction pole of all Eastern Asia and Russia the frontline of the Eurasianism expansion with it´s onslaughts in Europe and even in the US in the political, cultural and military fields. In a world were multinational powers (whether Eurasian or Western) grow excessively, it´s necessary to know where the greatest danger lies to know to situate itself more consciously and less unconfortably among great powers. In the Romania´s case this accomodation is strictly necessary, since the country is situated in Eastern Europe with Moldova and Ukraine, countries under Russia´s direct action.

 (Third and second editions of "The Garden of Afflictions", by the philospher Olavo de Carvalho: defense of inner freedom against the modern state´s intrusion. In the third edition, the philosopher corrects some distortions of his essay and supplements it with a brief analysis of the Dugin´s Neo-Eurasian plan.)

Finally, here is what Patapievici commented on the Brazilian philosopher: "Olavo de Carvalho is the complete opposite of the institucionalized intellectual", whose reply to Dugin he defined as "brilliant". This is keeping with I wrote in the text on Brexit: Dugin doesn´t understand Carvalho´s thought, he can´t see him out of an ideological frame, and for this very reason he feels confused in the debate he had with the Brazilian. For the Russian it was inconceivable that his adversary were an opponent of the Eurasian plan and also the Western globalist plan. It happens that Carvalho think as an individual and not within ideological schemes, however complex they may be. It´s this inner freedom that Patapievici also wants to preserve, because the nation´s freedom depends upon it. This last sentence isn´t a passionate, emotional defense of freedom: it´s the pillar of Olavo de Carvalho´s though, as the final chapter of which I consider the best of his book, The Garden of Afflictions (p. 307, 2nd edition) shows:

In the absence of spiritual power (...) power is the sole judge. Democratic or oligarchic, communist or capitalist, monarchical or republican, social-democrat or neoliberal, it will always be the Caesar´s power, with an incoercible propensity to self-divinize. And as long as we don´t understand these things we´ll continue to bet on this or that political system, not seeing that the merits of any political system depend essentially that it knows to respect the limits imposed by the people´s religious conscience, vivified by the presence of spiritual authority and based on values that precede from long the very birth of this system and the very society it governs; that precede, maybe, from eternity."

* Published in Portuguese on November 18th 2016.

The Eurasian Movement in Brazil: trajectory and arrest of Rafael Lusvarghi

(Lusvarghi in eastern Ukraine in early 2015.)

On the morning of October 6th, at 9 am, it was arrested at Boryspil International Airport, near Kiev, the Brazilian Rafael Marques Lusvarghi, 32 years old, one of the foreign fighters linked to pro-Russian separatists in the war in Ukraine. The arrest was carryed out by agents of the Inteligence Service of Ukraine (SBU) on charging of terrorist group formation according to Article 253-8 of the country´s Criminal Code. Lusvarghi is considered a foreign mercenary. With him were found an ID of the Donetsk People´s Republic (DPR) bearing an Igor Strelkov´s signature, Russian military and main leader of the War in Donbass, a DPR´s passport, a laptop with messages exchanged with groups considered terrorists and a medal as condecoration by services in combat, possibly given by Strelkov himself.

(Youtube video of the Intelligence Service of Ukraine that shows Rafael Lusvarghi detained by Ukranian agentes at Boryspil Airport, on October 6th.)

The Brazilian fighter´s arrest raised questions by pro-Russian supporters. Lusvargh was arrested because the plane he was inside, bound to Moscow, was diverted to land in Boryspil. The plane would be British Airways, rising suspicion that there would be a UK interference in his arrest.

On the same day a report from the Opera website, leftist Brazilian magazine friendly to Lusvarghi´s person, received a series of information from "friends and supporters of the Novorrosya´s cause" by André Ortega, former magazine´s correspondent that´s in Ukraine. According to him "netizens from the Russian-Ukranian world" suspected that Lusvarghi´s arrest were a made-up history. The justification was that the video released by the SBU showed the Brazilian´s face blurry, and his beard would be bulkier than presented in recent videos. The report says that "supporters sympathetic to Novorrosya´s cause" would be concerned about the Brazilian´s safety, as the Kiev government, which would act "neo-Nazi paramilitary groups", would be using torture against their prisioners. The text also accuses "nationalist radicals" and the Ukranian government´s paralisys of not complying the Minsk Agreements, including the war prisioners amnisty

(Blurred face rised suspicion by Lusvarghi´s defenders that the man arrested at Boryspil woundn´t be the Brazilian.)

On October 9th, the maganize published another report with Ortega´s informations commenting on the Lusvarghi´s trajectory untill his arrest. The fighter returned to Brazil at the end of 2015, where he worked in a fishing boat on the coast. He would have left Ukraine to be "tired of living in the region", having lived the war enough and was frustrated with the conflict stalemate and the uncertain ceasefire. His departure from Ukraine would be condition for compliance with the Minsk Agreements, since he is foreign fighter.

Lusvarghi had received work offers elsewhere in the world, among them the company Omega in August this year to act as security in a ship that would leave Odessa, in Ukraine, to Galle, in Sri Lanka. He accepted the offer, but at the same time reacted with concern. The Brazilian contacted the company to know the risk of passing through Ukraine after having fought in Donetsk and informed about the amnesty to the fighters according to the Minsk Agreements. He also sought guidance on his situation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brazil. According to Ortega, Lusvarghi accepted the offer because it offered only one-way ticket, to consider Odessa a pro-Russian city and trusting the Agreements. Omega would have come into contact with the office of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OCSE), located in London, that would have ensured that there´s no risk to the Brazilian. He bought the ticket on September 26th, flew to Turkey on October 5th and on 6th flew to Ukraine. According to the report, the Kiev´s Prosecutor would have issued arrest warrant against the Brazilian on October 4th, one day before his departure from Brazil, and a "pro-Ukranian site" would have disclosed the path of his trip. Theses informations would indicate that the SBU knew about the Lusvarghi´s passage by Ukraine.

Even without providing evidence, the magazine also suggests that Omega would have contributed to the arrest, since among it´s clients would be the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

The informations avaliable in the paragraphs above lead to a contradiction: if Lusvarghi went from Turkey to Ukraine, as Opera claims, then how would his flight, supposedly of British Airways, be going to Moscow? Otherwise the plane wouldn´t have it´s route diverted to land at the Boryspil airport. Either the Brazilian had Russia as a destination for a conection, or the magazine missed (or omitted for unknown reasons) this information.

The news website of pro-Russian militants Slavyngrad.org says that the Brazilian´s flight was on the Dublin-Moscow route. He would go to the Russian capital to negotiate a job offer in a ship security company (it doesn´t clarify if of Omega). Lusvarghi would have been deceived by SBU agents, who in the contact for the job offer would have passed as Russian agents. The site also rises the possibility that there would be UK´s interference, questioning the recklessness of the flight in making a stopover in Ukraine, that is in conflict with Russia.

The DPR´s media, as expected, also rejected the classification of the Brazilian as a "foreign mercenary", calling him an "internationalis worrior".

In Brazil, the Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) received the news of the Brazilian´s arrest on October 7th through it´s Embassy in Kiev. The Embassy´s consular section contacted the Ukranian authorities to visit Lusvarghi and have more information of what had happened. The answer came on 14th by the Itamaraty: the Brazilian would be well with access to god food, he didn´t suffered mistreatment, he had a lawyer, and a Ukrainian prosecutor was following up the case. These informations were released after the Embassy made a consular visit to Lusvarghi.

But how did the Brazilian fighter come to Ukraine? And what was his trajectory before the arrest?

(Lusvarghi, center, at the French Foreign Legion in 2006.)

L

Rafael Lusvarghi was born in Jundiaí, in São Paulo State, in a middle class family and descendant of Hungarians. His trajectory was decribed by himself in an interview granted to the website História Militar Online (HMO, Military History Online in English) in September 2015. This is the most complete description of his public life avaliable in the Brazilian media:

"My name is Rafael Marques Lusvarghi. I´m military officer, combatant officer, and a very good one. I started my career early, getting ready at the French Foreign Legion as parachutist in the Mountain Company of the 2EP [2eme Régiment de Étrancher Parachutistes] where I participated of some missions [that he can´t reveal], and also doing some courses. I was dispensed for health problems. Recovered, back to Brazil, I passed in a contest for soldier of the São Paulo State´s PM [military police] at the end of 2005.  

There my service was basically internal, with only a few ontensive rounds and radio patrol. But even so I learned a lot about the funcioning of the administrative area, and the bureaucratic part without that´s impossible to generate a great force. Although I don´t like this role, I consider indispensable the bureaucracy and the procedures stardadization operante modes.

Of course, ambicious and proud, I wanted to grow and become an officer. I passed on the competition to the CFO [Portuguese initials for Officer Training Course] in Pará State, and I attended the Coronel Fontoura Military Police Academy at IESP. Traditionalist, I decided for perfect myself in the cavalry and I was presented at the Cassulo de Melo Mounted Regiment.

In 2010 I made the big mistake of interrupting my military career, asking to discharge from the corporation. It was to go to live in Russia. I have never had patience with civilian life, lack of discipline and hierarchy, black in white.  

Back to Brazil in 2014, I took certain actions for reasons I disagree with today, the way the demonstrations unfold in Brazil is improperly. I would like to point out here that above all I´m apolitical today, even I have my conceptions, above all against all this victmism that plagues our nation, who wants do, who cries is weak, and as we say in the military circle, the weaks that explode. Therefore, I regret the reasons that took me to the streets [during the World Cup demonstrations in Brazil], but I don´t regret the struggles I involded myself. As free citizen and in spare time, I can do as I please not breakings the laws. If I want to drink and stop in the middle of a street without traffic, I will, if I want to drink dressing a skirt, I will too. And being right, I struggle to the death for my rights. As the US Marines say, one of the best forces in the world: Sempre Fi, do or die!

After released I returned to my project to participate in the civil war in Ukraine, on the pro-Russian side because... I´m pro-Russian unconditionally. But it turns out that it´s really the pro-Russian who are right in this issue."

Lusvarghi´s trip to Ukraine received significant attention from the Brazilian press. First because he was already known for participating in the street protests in Brazil in 2014; second, it was curious that a local citizen would go to such a distant country to engange in an armed conflict without direct connection to his homeland.

Despite the succint description of his career as military, police officer and figther, Lusvarghi omits some details that help to understand the trajectory and the reasons that made him to take these decisions.

The Brazilian´s actions became more "radical" after his return from Russia in 2010, where he took an Administration course in Kursk, worked and learned the Russian language. One of his teachers gave him the nickname "Riurik Varyag Volkovich", in reference to Rurik dinasty. Lusvarghi intended to enter the army, but wasn´t accepted for being a foreigner. He returned to Brazil in the around 2013/14. In this return period he claims to have gone to Colombia and contacted the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), to whom he would have made a "visit" in the city of Cartagena. He would have entered the guerrilla, but left because the guerrillas "don´t have culture (...) they don´t have prepare, they don´t have plan of what to do", and he was disapointed with the peace process then under negotiation between the group and the Bogotá government that would lead to the weapon delivery and the transformation of the guerrilla into a policial party.

(On the left, Lusvarghi´s detention by the military police in São Paulo, on June 12th, whose photo had great repercussion in the Brazilian press; on the right, the arrest on June 23th wearing a Scottish kilt.)

Back to Brazil, Lusvarghi got two jobs in the city of Indaiatuba, in the interior of São Paulo, one as an English teacher and another as a helpdesk assistant in a computer company. He participated in protests promoted by leftist movements and parties againts the expenses of the 2014 World Cup. In one of the demonstrations held in the city of São Paulo on June 12th, day of the event´s opening, he was detained after standing in front of the Military Police´s Shock Battalion. He received several rubber bullets shots and was only contained by five policemen officers at the same time. It was in this occasion that he became famous: in a photo widely divulged by the Brazilian press, he appears being strangled by a military policemen, which picture became one of the symbols of the protests against the World Cup.

(Scars that Lusvarghi has scored on his face in a tattoo studio: a stage of creating of a Nordic fighter.)

On June 17yh, Lusvarghi underwent to a scarification in a tattoo studio, a technique used to cut the skin and leave a scar, while the Brazil team played against México in the World Cup. The brand was inspired by the characters Leonidas, from the movie 300, Kratos, from an eletronic fight game, and a former Foreign Legion´s collegue. On June 23, he was in another protest, now at the Paulista Avenue, the main one in São Paulo. There were new clashes with the military police, but this time he and a friend student of Journalism at USP (University of São Paulo), Fábio Hideki, were arrested of charges of being black blocs and carrying explosives. The future fighter was dressed with his ideals of fight: scared face, long hair and beard (in allusion to the Nordic warriors), kilt, (Scottish dress similar to a skirt) and shirtless. He also carried a tattoo on his right shoulder with a symbol and the Russian word "biersek", that would be a reference to the Norse mithology warriors.

(Lusvarghi on the day of his release from Tremembés penitentiary, São Paulo State, on August 7th, with tattoo on his shoulder in a symbolic reference to Norse mythology.)

Lusvarghi was also charged of resistence, criminal action, incitement to crime and disobedience. The São Paulo Justice released him and his friend 45 days later, on August 7th, when reports from the Forensic Institut showed that the material they carried wasn´t explosive or incendiary, but empty cans of chocolate and yogurt that, according to the police, had a "smell of fuel". The judge, in turn, had classified the two as "gauche caviar" , in allusion to the fact that they would be hypocritical socialists. The arrest caused Lusvarghi the lose of both jobs and a trip to Ukraine, where he had already bought a ticket and would have to board on June 28th. Released from Tremembé penitentiary, where he was imprisioned, the future fighter sought help from "politically engaged friends" (whom, he said, wouldn´t be recruiters) and gathered documentation for travel. On September 18th, he and Hedeki were "summarily" acquitted of the charge of carrying explosives by the Court of Juistice of São Paulo. The next day, Lusvarghi was already in Moscow, from where posted a photo on Facebook that appears at Red Square. He arrived in Ukraine on day 20 to work with the pro-Russian separatists.

(Lusvarghi, on the left of the Brazilian flag, with the pro-Russian separatists in winter 2014/15)

As soon as he arrived in Ukraine, Lusvarghi joined the Prisrak Battalion, in Dombass, where most members were volunteers. His knowledge and experience in the military, police and armaments helped him to become a fighter. His trajectory in the first year of war was intense. The first combat he participated was in Vergulovka, in October 2014. In March 2015, he already commanded his own platoon with five Brazilians denominated Ernesto "Che" Guevara Internationalist Unit, in allusion to the Argentinian communist guerilla. The platoon was created with battalion´s permission of which it was part. The members came from different regions of Brazil, had vaired profiles and had as function to recognize the enemy and to commit acts of sabotage. Until this time, Lusvarghi would have directly participated in death of at least four Ukrainians soldiers, according to his own statement in an interview. On April 26, he got seriouly injuried on legs, trunk and arms after being hit by shots or a bomb´s shrapnel in the violent battle at Donetsk International Airport. Recovered at the city´s hospital, he returned to battle more than two months latter. His military role during almost this time was of mortars battery commander. 

With the disclosure of his photos on Facebook where he appears in combat, Lusvarghi has drawn more people from Brazil to fight on the side of pro-Russian militants. Today there are around ten Brazilians on the battlefield.

(Lusvarghi carrying out maintenance of the machine gun DShK 12,7 mm, at Donetsk Airport, on April 2015, just before being seriously injuried in a violent battle.)

The return from Russia, contact with the FARC, participation in the street protests in Brazil (whose motivations declares repetance) and the definitive trip to Ukraine revail an insistent search of the Brazilian for more dangerous activities. Some of his statements help to understand the personal and political motivations for such attitudes.

Shorlty after being released from prision, on August 7th 2014, he was interviwed by the G1 website of Globo Organizations. At one point the journalist questioned his ideology, and had the following answer:

"Left. I would say anarchist, but anarchist is a utopia. So I would stay in Stalinism. I would say anarchist if I though it worked, but it´s utopia. So I call myself a stalinist.

In the same interview, the journalist recalled that Lusvarghi had previously stated he was fan of the former governor of São Paulo State, Luiz Antônio Fleury Filho, for being a nationalist. But when questioned if he had sympathy for the Integralist movement (fascist and nationalist right-wing movement in Brazil in the 1930s), he showed rejection of the opposite spectre of the left: "I don´t like anything that has to do with the right", he replied.

(The Brazilian with Communist symbols: admiration to the left-wing ideologies and a growing adherance to Russian nationalism since 2014.)

On the last days of September 2014, just under two months after the interview with G1 website, Lusvarghi, just arrived in Ukraine, exchanged messages with newspaper O Estado de São Paulo where he once again aswered to questions on his political positions:

"On the political part, I oppose the imperialist advance in Ukraine, to the claws of the great international financial capital, the NATO´s base (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, lead by the US) pointing missiles to Russia."

In the interview granted to Istoé, one of the Brazil´s largest circulation maganizes, in January 2015, the Brazilian had been fighting in Donbass for four months. At the time he revealed some about his motivation to participate in the war in Ukraine. His interest on Russia is of long time, and he follows everything connected to the country. "In addition to descending from the peoples of the East, my interest comes from childhood, from everything related to Russia, history, culture, people´s mentality", he says, defining himself as leftwing and Stalinist. When asked why he believed that eastern Ukraine should become independent, he cited several historical cases of independence (including that of Kosovo, criticized by Russia) and justified the separatist movement for "the right to peoples´ self-determination". In another question, they asked why he elisted as volunteer in an foreign army, and he replied:

"... I fight here exclusively for the Great and Holy Mother Russia, my ancestors´ land, because the blood that flows in my vein is the same as the blood of the people here. Politically I´m totally against liberalism, the current UE and US policy. But my struggle is, above all, for the Russian people´s independence and the union of this people under the umbrella of only one country and only one leadership".

The fighter´s brother, Lucas Lusvarghi, says that since he was a child he was interested in military mattes, mainly war history, and studied a lot of Geography, History and strategy.

The Brazilian also makes clear in other statements his predilection for armed struggle and his preference for Russia. In the interview with the HMO website, in september of that year, they asked why he left Brazil to join the separatists. The answer was this:

"1) I´m not going to deny. I like war. Beside this, it´s not a lie, only live in peace who learn to fight. 2) I´m totally pro-Russian, that´s what brought me here, absolutely no political ideology."

He was also asked by a reader how he could conciliate his self-declared "left" position, published in Istoé magazine, with obedience for an authority like Igor Strelkov, according to the questioner a "right-wing monarchist" who "openly declares himself a Tzarist and 'white' nationalist" (in reference to anti-Bolshevik forces in the Russian Civil War in 1918-1922). Here´s what the Brazilian replied.

"When I said Stalinist, and stood as leftist, more than a year ago, I meant that I was an admirer, not a supporter of this flag. Several times I have made clear to be a practical person, who doesn´t buy ideas in closed packages, but a little here, a little there. I don´t support any flag myself... (...) It must be done the best for the nation. Answering your question, I see no problem in being commanded by anyone... command who can, obey who is judicious."

Another reader asked if, even as a "leftist ideology follower", he belivied in freedom of the pro-Russian ones after the conflict:

"I´m not leftist, and our struggle is precisely for the Kiev government not to forbid the Russian language and culture in the east of the country." 

In one of his last interviews, given to Slavyngrad.org website, Lusvarghi positioned himself in a nationalist of clearly Eurasian line. The interviwer asked him why he went to war, since, in his words, "loving Russia is one thing, but dying for the Russians is quite another". The Brazilian´s answer shows the language typical of the Eurasian movement:

"Well, in first place, Brazil and Russia are very closely aligned by the BRICS. Whatever is the Russia´s interest also favors Brazil in a geopolitical perspective. The BRICS can become a substitute for the US and European hegemony in the world - but only if the actions finally take the place of the words we hear now." 

"The US influence in Brazil is very strong. Everything the US touches goes away: familiy values and religion, though I´m not very religious. Everything become rather meaningless." 

As late as 2014, Lusvarghi had openly declared himself "leftist", "stalinist" and even "anarchist". In the interviews given at the end of the same year when he was already in Ukraine, he demonstrates a relative detachment from a "pure" far-left to which he sympathized when was in Brazil. When comparing the declarations about his political motivations and ideology, the Brazilian shows an "evolution" from a far-left to Russian nationalism between 2014 and 2015. 

Lusvarghi sees himself as a militant and legitimate heir of the Russia´s nationalist "cause" under a leftist, anti-American and anti-Western bias. Since he arrived in Ukraine his political positions, judging by the statements given to the Brazilian press, has become more pro-Russian than exclusively leftist. I would say a mixed of both, in an absorption of leftist ideology into Russian nationalism. He doesn´t openly state wheter he had any personal involvement with the ideais and Eurasian political movement, such as the Alexander Dugin´s thought or the Eurasian Youth Union, that since at least 2006 was already preparing a future war in Ukraine. This hypothesis is raised when Lusvarghi resorts to the same movement´s language by stating radically against Western liberalism, makes references to Russia´s geopolitics and at the same time demonstrates admiration for apparently antagonistic figures in the ideological field such as Stalin and Strelkov. Another clue, this more evident, is a photo published on July 18th 2015 in the "Brazilian Front of Solidarity with Ukraine", a Facebook group in support of pro-Russia, separatists, where Lusvarghi appears holding a Eurasian Movement´s symbol flag.

(Lusvarghi, on the right, with his battle colleague Luizz Davi: Eurasian Movement in war in Ukraine.)

The Neo-Eurasianism developed by Dugin has as one of it´s main characteristics the combination of far-left and far-right elements in the same political movement. This is made clear in the Russian thinker´s statements during the debate with the Brazilian philosopher Olavo de Carvalho, where he proposes an alliance among all social elements capable of facing the US globalism. Carvalho, in turn, warns exactly this aspect of Dugin´s Neo-Eurasianism, capable of absorbing extremists of both specters and make them work together in the name of a global dictadorship, as he comments in the article Eurasianism and Genocide.

Lusvarghi´s connection to the Eurasian movement is clearer in an interview given to the Vice News section in Portuguese and released nine days after he arrived in Ukraine. He states he "answered to the call of the Brazilian Front of Solidarity with Ukraine" and the Continental Brigade, armed branch of the Continental Unity, in his words a "synthesis between the the FARC and Hezbollah", to fight in the country. The Brigade, he says, is a unity within the Prisrak battallion, of which he´s member, and armed branch of the Unity, that originated in January 2014 in Belgrade, Serbia, and consists mainly of Serbs and French.

("Glory to Rafael Lusvarghi": Facebook page´s stylized cover used to exchange informations and recruit Brazilian fighters for war exalts the person of it´s main representative.)

But the most important thing here is the Lusvarghi´s mention to the "Brazilian Front of Solidarity with Ukraine". Altough it´s not possible to prove, this is possibly the group to which belong the "politically engaged friends" who would have helped Lusvarghi to go to Ukraine after leaving the jail. The group has a Facebook page that´s used to recruit future Brazilian fighters for pro-Russian separatists. There are also informations about the conflict and Russian or pro-Russian press news. It´s active members criticize Western countries and the Kiev government, including commemorating the death of soldiers on the Ukrainian side, and exhibit symbols and language characteristic of the Neo-Eurasian ideology. Many of them exchange messages asking informations on how to get on the battlefield. The great page´s symbol, that untill now has almost twelve thousand likes (many only as observers), is Lusvarghi, pioneer and reference for the Brazilians which want to fight on the Russian side of the war. The page´s cover presents a stylized image of him with the greeting "Glory to Rafael Lusvarghi" in Russian.

On October 7th, one day after the arrest, it was created on Facebook a page for asking the Brazilian´s freedom: "Free Rafael Lusvarghi". Until this day it had one thousand likes.

(Picture taken from the Facebook page that ask for the Lusvarghi´s release: similarity with Jesus Christ´s figure - added the light from the top that illuminates his face - reinforces an idealized image of the Brazilian.)

In the next text we´ll see how this recruitment is done, the contacts network in Brazil and who are the Brazilians which, besides Lusvarghi, are fighting on the side of pro-Russian separatists.

* Published in Portuguese on November 1st 2016.